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Algorithmic consumer credit scoring has caused anxiety among scholars 
and policy makers. After a significant legislative effort by the European Union, the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that has provisions tailored to 
automated decision-making (ADM) was implemented. When the EU Commission 
and the US Department of Commerce negotiated for US organizations to whom 
data from EU data controller is transferred to comply with the key principles of EU 
Data Protection Law under the EU-US Privacy Shield (PS) Framework, the 
Department of Commerce refused to incorporate the GDPR principles governing 
ADM in the PS Framework. The EU Commission accepted this refusal reasoning 
that where US companies make automated decisions with respect to EU data 
subjects, such as in consumer credit risk scoring, there are laws in the US that 
protect the consumer from adverse decisions. This view contradicts 
recommendations for implementing GDPR-Inspired law in the US to tackle the 
challenges of automated consumer credit scoring.  
This article argues that despite the differences in the approach to the 
regulation of automated consumer credit scoring in the EU and the US, consumers 
are similarly protected in both jurisdictions. Furthermore, US consumer credit 
laws have the necessary flexibility to ensure that adverse automated decisions are 
tackled effectively. This article, through analyzing statutes, cases, and empirical 
evidence, demonstrates that the seemingly comprehensive legal rules governing 
ADM in the GDPR do not make the EU consumers better off. In addition, the 
challenges presented by the increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI), 
especially machine learning, place both the EU and the US legal regimes in a 
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similar position as neither jurisdiction is equipped to respond to autonomous, 
unpredictable, and unexplainable algorithms making decisions.  
While the EU’s risk-based approach to AI regulation adopted by the Draft 
AI Regulation which also contains provisions on regulatory sandboxing is a 
significant improvement, it does not significantly change the rules regarding 
algorithmic consumer credit scoring. Nevertheless, this is the approach that 
regulation should primarily adopt for the future.  
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THE CONTEXT  
 
 Any financial institution that engages in the business of lending money in 
the European Union (EU) or the United States (US) has the right and obligation to 
ensure a thorough assessment of the borrower’s capacity to repay the loan. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, attributed in part to the subprime 
mortgage crisis,1 the responsibility to assess consumer borrowers’ ability to repay 
has been more standardized and strengthened in both jurisdictions.2 In modern 
credit risk assessment processes, the likelihood of the borrower defaulting is 
evaluated through a statistical method using the consumer’s credit data and is 
reduced to a specific number—the credit score.3 Over the years, creditworthiness 
assessment has evolved from interview-based assessment and decisions made by 
loan officers,4 to automated decision-making with minimal human intervention. 
These decisions are based on data collected from the consumer, but also much more 
unlikely sources such as social networks.5 These automated decisions in financial 
services have attracted the attention of scholars, regulators, and consumer advocacy 
groups who are often concerned that by using algorithms and big data, financial 
institutions may circumvent legal regimes that protect consumers and other 
vulnerable groups. This is due to the financial institution’s use of predictive analysis 
 
1IMAD A. MOSSA, GOOD REGULATION, BAD REGULATION THE ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION102 (2015); see generally Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address: Understanding the 
Subprime Financial Crisis, 60S. C. L. REV. 549-571 (2009). 
2In the EU, one of the important pieces of legislations that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis 
is Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on 
Credit Agreements for Consumers Relating to Residential Immovable Property and Amending 
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, 2014 O.J. (L 60) 3 
[hereinafter “Consumer Mortgage Directive”]. In the US, The Dodd Frank Act introduced the 
Ability-to- Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule — Regulation Z, effective 1/10/2014. The Dodd 
Frank Act introduced the Ability-to- Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule — Regulation Z, 
effective 1/10/2014. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has issued a final rule to 
implement this regulation that provides eight criteria to determine the consumer’s ability to pay 
on a mortgage. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2013).  
3CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, What is a credit 
score, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit- score-en-
315/ (last updated June 8, 2017).  
4Matthew A. Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders Use of Big Data, 93 CHI.-
KENT L. REV.3, 11-12 (2018).  
5Nate Cullerton, Behavioral Credit Scoring, 110 GEO L. J. 808, 815 (2013); see also Yanhao Wei 
et al., Credit Scoring with Social Network Data, 35 MARKETING SCI. 234-258 (2015).  
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that may bypass decision-making which is based on the objective assessment of the 
individual consumer’s circumstances.6 
In the EU, the most significant legal instrument governing automated consumer 
credit scoring is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)7 which contains 
a few provisions tailored to Automated Decision Making (ADM).8 The GDPR has 
triggered a great deal of change in how businesses manage personal data not only 
for entities established in the EU but also non-EU entities with a business link to 
the EU.9 While it is yet to be proven whether the GDPR provisions on ADM 
achieve their intended objective of protecting the consumer from potentially 
arbitrary and opaque algorithmic decisions, it has been touted as a model for the 
regulation of not only data privacy in general but also automated consumer credit 
scoring in the US.10 
 
 In 2016, the EU Commission and the US Department of Commerce 
implemented the EU-US Privacy Shield (PS) Framework, under which US-based 
organizations to whom EU-based data controllers transfer data self-certify11 to 
comply with the key principles of the GDPR.12 The final document of the EU-US 
PS Framework excluded the principles of GDPR on ADM.13 
In the US, the most significant federal statutes pertinent to ADM are the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-
 
6See Giovanni Comandè, Regulating Algorithms Regulation? First Ethico-Legal Principles, 
Problems and Opportunities of Algorithms, in 32 STUDIES IN BIG DATA 169, 174 (Tania 
Cerquitelli, Daniel Quercia& Frank Pasquale eds., 2017); see also Matthew Adam Bruckner, 
supra note 4, at 26. 
7Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
[hereinafter “GDPR”]. 
8See id. at recital 71; arts. 2, 14, 20, 21, 22. 
9Cedric Ryngaert & Mistale Taylor, The GDPR as Global Data Protection, 114 AJIL 
UNBOUND 5, 9 (2020).    
For extra-territorial application of the GDPR, see GDPR, art. 3.  
10Vlad E. Hertza, Fighting Unfair Classifications in Credit Reporting: Should the United States 
Adopt GDPR-Inspired Rights in Regulating Consumer Credit, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1707, 
1712 (2018).  
11Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by 
the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, 2016 O.J. (L 207).  
12The EU-US Privacy Shield decision was adopted on 12 July 2016 and the Privacy Shield 
framework became operational on 1 August 2016. EU-US data transfers, EUR. 
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-
protection/eu-us-data-transfers_en (last visited March 13, 2012). 
13See infra section 4.3.2(B)(i). 




Bliley Act (GLBA),14 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA). 15  Despite the existence of these sector specific 
legislation the EU Commission found to be satisfactory, studies claim that 
automated credit scoring is inadequately regulated in the US.16 This aligns with the 
overwhelming sentiment that the US is lagging behind in terms of protecting 
consumer privacy.17 In fact, in a New York University Law Review article, Hertza 
called for GDPR- inspired reform of the legal regimes governing ADM in consumer 
credit reporting in the US.18 
 
 The enactment of the first comprehensive privacy law in California in 
2018—the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) 19 – also seems to be 
suggestive of the pressure being felt by lawmakers in addressing privacy concerns 
in the US. This article argues that while US privacy law in general may require 
reform, the US does not need specific rules for automated consumer credit scoring. 
The existing literature calling for reform in the US is based on flawed premises that 
(a) the US legal rules governing consumer credit are incapable of addressing 
technology-driven legal challenges, and (b) the GDPR provisions on ADM 
effectively protect the consumer. Neither assumption has been closely examined or 
validated based on empirical evidence and the actual enforcement cases. 
 
THE KEY CLAIM 
 
 This article argues that despite the differences in the approach to regulation 
of ADM in consumer loan underwriting in the EU and the US, the two legal 
jurisdictions respond to the phenomenon in a fairly similar manner. This article 
 
14Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999).  
1515 U.S.C. § 1691-1691(f). 
16Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era 
of Big Data, 18 YALE J. L.& TECH. 148 (2016);  
see also Hertza, supra note 10. 
17See Kelsy Wroten, Why is America So Far Behind Europe 
on Digital Privacy, N. Y. TIMES (June 8,  
2019), https://www nytimes.com/2019/06/08/opinion/sunday/privacy-congress-facebook-
google.html; see also Thomas Holt, Data Privacy Rules in the EU May Leave the US Behind, 
THE CONVERSATION(Jan. 23, 2019),https://theconversation.com/data-privacy-rules-in-the-eu-
may-leave-the-us-behind-110330. 
18Hertza, supra note 10 (arguing for a General Data Protection Regulation-inspired law for 
consumer credit scoring in the US and claiming that the US Fair Credit Reporting Act and the 
Equal Credit Opportunities Act are not sufficient to address the challenges of alternative credit 
scoring. Although Hertza focuses on algorithmic credit scoring, he calls for an overarching reform 
of US data protection law).  
19Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020).  
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examines statutory and relevant enforcement cases including judicial decisions in 
both jurisdictions.  
 
 First, the article aims to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of 
the two legal regimes with respect to automated consumer credit scoring. Second, 
it shows that contrary to the prevailing view, the lack of recently implemented legal 
regime governing ADM in the US does not mean that US consumers are worse off 
when compared to their EU counterparts. Third, the challenge presented by the 
increasing sophistication of Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially machine 
learning, puts both the EU and the US in the same regulatory and legal quandary as 
neither jurisdiction is equipped to respond to autonomous, unpredictable, and 




 There are three main reasons behind writing this article. First, there are 
theories for reform in the US inspired by the GDPR for the regulation of ADM in 
the consumer credit industry,21 whose validity requires scrutiny. Existing literature 
portrays the GDPR as a good model for reform—a view that this articles questions. 
The theory is tested by analyzing the legal regimes in the two jurisdictions as well 
as enforcement cases (including judicial decisions) and empirical evidence on 
consumer behavior. In the two years since the GDPR has been implemented, no 
such work has been undertaken, despite academics not being shy about alluding to 
the superiority of the GDPR in regulating ADM.  
 
 
20Maja Brkan & Grégory Bonnet, Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s Quest for 
Explanation of Algorithmic Decisions: of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morgana, 11 EUR. J. 
RISK REGULATION 19, 49 (2020).  
21Pasquale argues: “Data protection rules like the GDPR effectively raise the cost of surveillance 
and algorithmic processing of people. They help re-channel technologies of algorithmic 
governance toward managing the natural world, rather than managing people.” Frank 
Pasquale, Data Nationalization in the Shadow of 
Social Credit Systems, L. POL ECON. PROJECT (June 18, 2018), 
https://lpeblog.org/2018/06/18/data-nationalization-in-the- shadow-of-social-credit-systems/. In 
his testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs he asserted that policymakers “…should look to Europe’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which provides several standards 
for algorithmic accountability.” Frank Pasquale, Exploring the Fintech Landscape, Written 
Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on the Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs (Sept. 12, 2017),https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Pasquale%20Testimony
%209-12-17.pdf; see also Hertza, supra note 10(arguing why the US should adopt GDPR-Inspired 
legal regime specifically for ADM in consumer credit risk assessment).  




 Second, current legal developments could potentially depict US data 
privacy law as completely inapt to cope with technological challenges. On July 16, 
2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) struck down the EU 
Commission’s decision which held that the US has a privacy legal regime that 
provides adequate protection to EU consumers — ‘the Adequacy Decision’22—that 
has been valid since 2016.23 Under this judgment, Facebook Ireland and, as a 
consequence of the judgment, other EU data controllers were prohibited from 
transferring data to the US under the Adequacy Decision.24 This judgment is likely 
to amplify the sentiment that US data privacy law in general is weak. The court 
found the Adequacy Decision invalid only because data subjects whose data are 
transferred from the EU do not have the same level of protection due to lack of 
protective safeguard for consumer rights vis-à-vis public authorities.25 These rights 
include access and enforceable rights, as well as channels for an effective remedy 
in the context of data processing by public authorities in pursuit of national security 
interest and law enforcement.26 In other words, the prevalence of state surveillance 
under various legislations, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA)27 and Executive Order 12333,28 enables public authorities to access data 
from private actors without sufficient safeguards indicating that the US does not 
provide adequate data protection to EU consumers.29 In the aftermath of the ECJ 
judgment, confusions about how good a model the GDPR is for reforming data 
privacy law pertaining to ADM are likely to reign, whilst the specific reasoning of 
the court is likely to be neglected. 
 
 Third, the general contentment with the provisions of GDPR governing 
ADM has the effect of deterring further necessary works that must be done to revise 
the rules. This article cautions about the false sense of security that seems to be 
prevailing regarding the level of consumer protection which the GDPR can provide. 
 
 
22Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, 2020 
ECLI:EU:C:2020:559, ¶198 (July 16, 2020).  
23Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250.  
24Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. And Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, at ¶¶197-
201.  
25Id. ¶¶165-168.  
26Id. ¶¶115-140, 203.  
2750 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c).  
28Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). 
29Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. And Maximillian Schrems, Case C-311/18, at ¶192.  
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 It is not within the purview of this article to show the extent and manner in 
which US data privacy law should be reformed.30 But, it argues that the rules 
governing ADM in the consumer credit industry available under the GDPR should 
not cloud the judgment of policy makers regarding the GDPR’s actual 




 The article is divided into 6 sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
ADM in consumer credit risk assessment. In this section, a succinct differentiation 
is made between various related and fundamental concepts namely, Algorithm, 
ADM, AI, and machine learning. While this section shortly addresses divergent 
theories about the definition of AI, it does not take a position on what an AI is 
because settling the definitional controversy around AI requires a separate work. 
For this reason, the article prefers the term ADM that encompasses all algorithmic 
decisions that remove human intervention significantly from the process. Section 3 
analyzes the opportunities and risks in automated consumer credit scoring. This 
section examines efficiency, impartiality, and financial inclusion as benefits of 
automated consumer credit scoring, and inaccuracy and bias/discrimination as the 
concomitant risks. Section 4 investigates effective consumer protection in the EU 
and the US, by examining privacy consent and transparency in automated consumer 
credit scoring. It will be demonstrated that the legal rules and recent enforcement 
in the US show that a tailor-made legal regime is not required to address consumer 
vulnerability. Section 5 addresses the unique challenges of machine learning that 
limit the effectiveness of legal rules and suggests a holistic approach to tackling the 
challenge that both jurisdictions should adopt moving forward. It examines risk-
based approaches to the regulation with respect to machine learning credit scoring 
and regulatory sandboxing as potential solutions to be adopted. The article argues 
while these solutions are adopted by the EU’ Draft AI Regulation (hereinafter 
 
30For insights into reforming US Privacy law, see Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 
YALE L. J. 902 (2009) (arguing that it would be a mistake for the United States to enact 
a comprehensive or omnibus federal privacy law for the 
private sector that preempts sectoral privacy law); Alan Charles Raul, et al.,  
, United States, in THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY L. REV., 3
99-421 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 2019) (tracking the shift in US privacy regulation); Lindsey 
Barret, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, 
the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 49 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. (2019) (comparing and 
contrasting the US and European models of privacy regulation).  




“DAIR”),31 the proposed regulation does not satisfactorily implement the notion of 
risk-based approach. Section 6 will provide concluding remarks.  
 
2. AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 
 
2.1.  CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 
 
 Consumer credit scoring is a method of quantifying the credit risk posed by 
a borrower using a statistical method to determine the effect of various credit data 
associated with the loan applicant on the applicant’s probability of default.32 Credit 
scoring has been through several stages of evolution. There was a time when a 
person’s standing in the community sufficed to strike a loan deal with a bank.33 
Historically, credit reporting agencies used to conduct consumer credit risk 
assessment through information collated by hired professional reporters who 
profiled potential customers. 34  The more modern and standardized procedure 
involved assessing creditworthiness based on information supplied by the 
customer, obtained from other conventional sources and face-to-face interview 
where loan officers exercised a discretion in their final decision.35 Today, credit 
scoring has changed significantly with the technological advancement.   
 
2.2.  AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING—THE RISE OF ALGORITHMS 
 
 Already in the 1940s, the credit scoring system started to introduce semi-
automation that relied largely on manual implementation of the scoring system.36 
 
31Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down 
Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain 
Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final, (21 April 2021), 
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2021/EN/COM-2021-206-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-
1.PDF  
32 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress on Credit Scoring and Its 
Effects on the Availability and Affordability of Credit at S-1 (August 2007), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf;  Loretta J. 
Mester, What is the Point of Credit Scoring, BUS. REV. (1997), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-
/media/frbp/assets/economy/articles/business-review/1997/september-october/brso97lm.pdf.  
33 Cullerton, supra note 5, at 880.  
34 Rachel O’Dwyer, Algorithms are making the same mistakes assessing credit scores that humans 
did a century ago, QUARTZ (May 14, 2018), https://qz.com/1276781/algorithms-are-making-the-
same-mistakes-assessing-credit-scores-that-humans-did-a-century-ago/.    
35 Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect on the Lending Industry, 4 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 443, 443 (2000). 
36 Peter L. McCorkell, The Impact of Credit Scoring and Automated Underwriting on Credit 
Availability in the IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER PROTECTION 209, 209-10 (Thomas A. 
Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002).  
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A more advanced automated credit scoring was introduced in the 1950s by Fair and 
Isaac who believed that algorithmic decisions would be better than decisions based 
on human judgment. 37  The FICO score which is widely used by financial 
institutions today (about 90 % of top lenders in the US),38  have various ranges for 
different financial products with 300-850 (for mortgage) —a higher score 
representing less risk.39 
 
  When a financial institution conducts FICO score for a loan applicant, the 
computer algorithm analyzes the applicant’s credit risk based on his/her credit 
history(history of borrowing and repayment including default) held at the top three 
credit bureaus—Experian, Equifax and TransUnion. 40  The FICO scoring 
proprietary algorithm looks for patterns in the credit report data “that historically 
have been associated with payment defaults among consumers” on the basis of 
which it assigns the credit score.41 Thus, the algorithm collects collates, classifies, 
and analyses thousands of data points to make a predictive decision. The criteria 
for FICO scoring are by far generally comprehensible, if not fully explainable—
payment history (35%), credit utilization ratio (30%) length of credit history (15%), 
credit mix (10%), and credit inquiries (10%). 42  While the legitimacy of these 
criteria could be questioned on its own, FICO scores could also be wrong if the 
credit information received from the credit bureaus is inaccurate.43 
 
 In the realm of automated consumer credit scoring, FICO scoring 
algorithms could be regarded as the tip of the iceberg. In the FinTech sector, there 
are several online credit facilities where a decision on the consumer’s application 
is processed instantly using machine learning algorithms without the involvement 
 
37 Id. 
38What is a Credit Score?,MYFICO,https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/credit-
scores#:~:text=A%20credit%20score%20tells%20lenders,by%2090%25%20of%20top%20lenders
. 
39 Constance Brinkley-Badgett, What Does FICO Stand For? What is a FICO Score?,CREDIT.COM 
(Apr. 11, 2018),https://www.credit.com/credit-scores/what-does-fico-stand-for-and-what-is-a-fico-
credit-score/. 




42 Jeanine Skowronski, What Is a FICO Credit Report or FICO Score?, CREDIT.COM (Apr. 15, 
2019),https://www.credit.com/credit-reports/credit-bureau/fico-credit-report/.  
43How do I correct errors on my credit reports?, MYFICO,  https://www.myfico.com/credit-
education/faq/credit-reports/correcting-credit-report-
errors#:~:text=To%20correct%20errors%20on%20your,report%20can%20hurt%20your%20score. 




of a human decision maker.44 Online lenders may use an algorithm and thousands 
of pieces of information about its customers to make a decision on short term loans 
in seconds.45 Once the consumer submits an application, the algorithm collects data 
about the consumer supplied by the consumer and mined from different online 
platforms46 and scores the applicant and decides either to grant or deny the loan or 
classify which type of loan the applicant is qualified for. There are several 
companies that provide machine learning software for credit risk assessment 
including Zestfinance, Kreditech and SAS.47 All of these automated credit scoring 
systems have algorithms in common. 
 
 2.2.1.  FROM ALGORITHMS TO MACHINE LEARNING 
 
 The underlying tool of any automated consumer credit scoring is an 
algorithm. According to Coormen, a computer algorithm is “a set of steps to 
accomplish a task that is described precisely enough that a computer can run it.”48 
While some algorithms perform relatively simpler tasks such as computing a simple 
mathematical equation, others that are referred to as AI engage in complex 
decision-making process that involve mimicking human intelligence (“certain 
operations of human brain”).49 Thus, automated consumer credit scoring could be 
conducted by machine learning—a sub-field of AI50 that uses computers to learn 
patterns and rules from data and experience.51 
 
 But, there is no agreement as to when an algorithm becomes AI rather than 
a tool that fails to meet the threshold of intelligence, leading to a significant 
 
44Anna Oleksyuk, 5 Uses of Machine Learning in Finance and FinTech, MEDIUM  (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@annoleksyuk/5-uses-of-machine-learning-in-finance-and-fintech-
9cf4a7530695.   
45Parmy Olson, The Algorithm That Beats Your Bank Manager, FORBES (Mar. 15, 
2015),https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/03/15/the-algorithm-that-beats-your-bank-
manager/#2cf600d81ae9. 
46 Cullerton supra note 5, at 809.  
47Niccolo Mejia, AI for Credit Scoring – An Overview of Startups and Innovation, EMERJ (Jan. 18, 
2019), https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/ai-for-credit-scoring-an-overview-of-startups-and-
innovation/.  
48THOMAS H. COORMEN, ALGORITHMS UNLOCKED 1(2013). 
49 Lauri Donahue, Comment, A Primer on Using Artificial Intelligence in the Legal Profession, 
HARV. J. OF L. TECH. (January 3, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/a-primer-on-using-
artificial-intelligence-in-the-legal-profession.   
50PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING 
MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 8(2015).   
51YADONG CUI, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND JUDICIAL MODERNIZATION 120 (2020) (“It can be 
said that machine learning is the study of ‘learning algorithms,’ which are essentially advanced 
versions of ordinary algorithms that make computer programs smarter by automatically 
discovering and learning data rules.”). 
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difference of opinion regarding the definition of AI.52 Since many of the FinTech 
companies employ machine learning algorithms and possibly deep learning 
techniques,53 and the legal challenges posed by machines learning are peculiar, the 
distinction between algorithms and AI is useful to bear in mind.     
 
 Kaplan argues that it is difficult to answer the question “what is artificial 
intelligence” because (a) of the lack of commonly agreed upon definition of 
intelligence, and (b) so far, machine intelligence and human intelligence bear no 
resemblance, 54  the latter making it questionable to define AI with human 
intelligence as a point of reference. In Turner’s words, “[d]efining AI can resemble 
chasing the horizon: as soon as you get to where it was, it has moved somewhere 
into the distance.”55  Despite the tricky nature of AI, Turner argues that defining it 
is required because it is crucial to have a “specific and workable definition when 
describing conducts and phenomena which are subject to regulation.”56 
 
 Turner takes a functional approach to AI by describing it as “the ability of 
a non-natural entity to make choices by an evaluative process.”57 According to him, 
AI should possess the ability to make choice autonomously and to weigh various 
principles in making a decision.58 Turner’s definition takes a narrow approach to 
AI. Surden distinguishes between machine learning and knowledge representation 
and reasoning (KR),59 as branches of AI.  While machine learning AI has “[t]he 
ability to automatically learn and improve from experience without being explicitly 
programmed,” 60 KR (Rule Based AI) operates based on pre-determined set of 
parameters.61 Rule-Based AI may also be referred to as deterministic algorithm 
 
52Automating Society: Taking Stock of Automated Decision-Making in the EU, ALGORITHM 
WATCH (2019), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/automating-society-2019/ (“Artificial Intelligence is 
a fuzzily defined term that encompasses a wide range of controversial ideas and therefore is not 
very useful to address the issues at hand.”). 
53 Deep learning is an advanced form of machine learning. See Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic 
Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 (2019). Although deep 
learning is considered to present even a heightened legal challenge, this article does not make a 
distinction between deep learning and machine learning as making such distinction is not required 
for the narrative of the article.  
54JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 (2016).  
55JACOB TURNER, ROBOT RULES: REGULATING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 8 (2019). 
56Id. at 8-9.  
57Id. at 16.  
58Id. at 16-17.  
59Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1337 
(2019).  
60Id. at 1311, 1315; see also Cofone, supra note 53, at 1394. 
61Surden, supra note 59, at 1316.  




because this type of AI “produces on a given input the same results following the 
same computation steps.”62 
 
 Turner argues that the Rule-Based AI, which he identifies as Symbolic 
Program (or Good Old AI or Classical AI) does not qualify as AI.63 He believes 
that any intelligence reflected in this type of program which functions with decision 
tree (if X, then Y), is of the programmer and not of itself.64 The rationale behind 
this approach is that no matter how well the algorithm performs a computation, 
because the program follows the same rule written by the software programmer, it 
does not possess intelligence different from what the designer has embodied in it.65 
 
 If Turner’s approach is followed, a human being that otherwise is 
considered intelligent would fail to be treated as an intelligent being. First, a human 
being for the most part learns from its surrounding environment66 and is to a certain 
degree programmed to reproduce certain outcomes. This fact by itself does not 
make a human being a non-intelligent entity. A fully grown adult that for some 
reason is unable to improve its emotional intelligence67 but computes the most 
complex mathematical problems with exceptional speed does not cease to be an 
intelligent being because mathematics is learned from someone and there is no 
improvement in any other aspect of its intelligence. 
 
 To be fair, it is possible to provide equally convincing reasons in support of 
Turner’s narrow approached to defining AI. Unsurprisingly, any given definition 
of AI is amenable to criticism from various angles which makes attempt to provide 
a universal definition futile. While intuitively, this is concerning from the 
perspective of framing legal policies and rules, some argue that the lack of universal 
definition has helped grow the field and allowed researchers, practitioners, and 
developers to be guided by a rough sense of direction.68 In the same vein, this article 
 
62 A. Bockmayr and K. Reinert, Concepts: Types of Algorithm, DISCRETE MATH FOR 
BIOINFORMATICS WS 10/11(Oct. 18, 2010), http://www mi fu-
berlin.de/wiki/pub/ABI/DiscretMathWS10/runtime.pdf.  
63 Turner, supra note 55, at 18. 
64Id. at 19.  
65See id. at 18. 
66Elsbeth Stern, Individual differences in the learning potential of human beings, NPJ SCI. OF 
LEARNING, Jan. 12, 2017, at 1. 
67 “[A]n emotional, intelligence competency is an ability to recognize, understand, and use 
emotional information about oneself that leads to or causes effective or superior performance.” 
Richard E. Boyatzis, A behavioral approach to emotional Intelligence, 28 J. OF MGMT DEV. 749, 
757 (2009).  
68Peter Stone et al., Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030, ONE HUNDRED YEAR STUDY ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: REPORT OF THE 2015 STUDY PANEL, 1, 12 (Sept. 2016), 
http://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report. 
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does not intend to settle the definitional controversy in AI. It rather takes a broader 
approach by employing a generic term automated consumer credit scoring (or 
ADM) that encompasses both symbolic programs and machine learning. The 
cursory review of the controversy surrounding the definition of AI is necessary only 
to highlight on the fact that machine learning being a branch of AI presents an 
unprecedented legal challenge. 
 
 Machine learning scoring could effortlessly combine and analyze data 
collected from the consumer, third parties (like data brokers), public platforms (like 
social networking sites), and financial institutions related to the scoring service 
providers (or the financial institution) through complex contractual relationships.69 
This gives the entity conducting the credit risk assessment a wide range of data 
points. 70  Second, with algorithms, the data collection and analysis could be 
conducted in a fraction of second.71 Third, there could be higher propensity for 
inaccurate data to go undetected and the consequences of the inaccuracies would 
go unmitigated.72 Finally, automated scoring could mask discriminatory practices 
that allow financial institutions to remove factors that are defined as illegal from 
their scoring criteria by using proxies such as zip codes.73 Ultimately, while the 
algorithm removes human oversight and potentially distances humans from liability 
for decisions, it could foster decisions that may not accurately reflect the 
consumer’s personal circumstance based on co-relations rather than causation.74 
 
 While determinist algorithmic scoring raises many concerns, machine 
learning presents heightened regulatory challenges.75 The ability of the machine to 
learn from its experience and to update its decision independently of human 
 
69McCorkell, supra note 36, at 812. 
70Daniel Faggella, Machine Learning for Underwriting and Credit Scoring - Current Possibilities, 
EMERJ (Apr. 3, 2020),https://emerj.com/partner-content/machine-learning-underwriting-credit-
scoring/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
71 Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses Are Collecting Data (And What They're Doing with It), BUS. 
NEWS DAILY (updated June 17, 2020), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-
collecting-data html (last visited Mar. 14, 2021). 
72 Bruckner, supra note 4, at 52-54; Kristin Johnson, Frank Pasquale & Jennifer Chapman, 
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Bias in Finance: Toward Responsible Innovation, 
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 499, 510 (2019); Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, automated Suspicion 
Algorithms and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 925 (2016). 
73McCorkell, supra note 36, at 828.  
74 Karen Yeung, Algorithmic regulation: A critical interrogation, 12 REG. & GOVERNANCE 505, 
516 (2018).  
75 “The decision-making process is deterministic, meaning that each step can in theory be traced 
back to decisions made by a programmer no matter how numerous the stages.” TURNER, supra 
note 55, at 18. 




oversight causes a great concern for scholars, consumers and policy makers.76 The 
dynamic interaction of algorithm with big data77 and its ability to make biased and 
discriminatory decisions without the corresponding duty of explanation represents 
a new chapter in the algorithmic regulatory challenge.78 No legal regime today, 
including the GDPR, is equipped to deal with complex machine learning decision 
systems.  
 
3. THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT 
SCORING 
 
3.1.  THE ADVANTAGES OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 
 
 Despite the growing concern about algorithmic decisions, algorithms are 
becoming an integral part of financial services today. Automated consumer credit 
scoring could provide three major benefits—efficiency, impartiality, and financial 
inclusion.  
 
 3.1.1.  EFFICIENCY 
 
 Automated consumer credit scoring is deemed to be efficient as it increases 
the ease of using multiple data points with low transaction cost and enhances 
potentially more accurate decisions by increasing the amount of data point used to 
assess the consumer’s credit risk.79 In addition to utilizing the so-called traditional 
credit data, such as “loan or credit limit information, debt repayment history, 
account status, “credit inquiries,” and “public records relating to bankruptcies,”80 
automated (alternative credit scoring) exploits non-traditional credit data, including 
“[r]ental payments, [m]obile phone payments, [c]able TV payments, [b]ank 
account information, such as deposits, withdrawals or transfers, [and][s]mall dollar 
 
76 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithm, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 660(2017).  
77JAMES R. KALYVAS & MICHAEL R. OVERLY, BIG DATA: A BUSINESS AND LEGAL GUIDE 1 
(2015).  
78See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. 
REV. 671 (2017).  
79 Nikita Aggarwal, Law and Autonomous Systems Series: Algorithmic Credit Scoring and the 
Regulation of Consumer Credit Markets, OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/11/law-and-autonomous-systems-series-
algorithmic-credit-scoring-and.  
80The State of Alternative Credit Data: How the Financial Services Industry is Adopting and 
Benefiting from These New Data Sources, EXPERIAN 4 (2018), 
https://www.experian.com/assets/consumer-information/white-papers/alternative-credit-data-
paper.pdf.  
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loans.”81 It may even use insights from social media82 and other digital footprints.83 
Consequently, automated consumer credit scoring is efficient on two fronts.  
 
 Automated consumer credit scoring eases and reduces the cost of processing 
alternative data including “social media footprints, psychometrics, online behavior 
data, and telecommunications data, including top-up patterns (for prepaid 
customers), mobile money use, and even calling patterns and contacts.”84  From the 
lender’s point of view, algorithms can reduce the cost of acquiring and processing 
information using human labor and the potential loss from granting a loan to a 
credit-unworthy consumer.85 
 
 By increasing the data point that can be used for scoring, automated scoring 
could increase accuracy and reduce the incidence of refusing loan to a creditworthy 
consumer.86 It could in turn ensure that credit is distributed efficiently.87 Although 
there is no conclusive evidence that consumers ultimately gain from the efficiency 
stemming from accurate automated consumer credit scoring,88 what is indisputable 
is that automated consumer credit scoring gives lenders a speed advantage in loan 
processing and thus in the short-run reduces transaction cost.  
   
 
81Id. at 5. 




83See generally Tobias Berg et al., On the Rise of FinTechs: Credit Scoring Using Digital 
Footprints, 33 R. FIN. STUD. 2845-2897 (2020), 
https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/33/7/2845/5568311.   
84FINANCIAL INCLUSION, INFRASTRUCTURE AND ACCESS UNIT, DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE 
CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING INDUSTRY: DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS, FINTECH NOTE 
NO. 3, WORD BANK GROUP 19 (2019). 
85 Kenneth G. Gunter, Computerized Credit Scoring's Effect on the Lending Industry, 4 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 443, 449 (2000).   
86Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
148, 155-156 (2016). 
87 Susan Wharton Gates, Vanessa Gail Perry & Peter M. Zorn, Automated Underwriting in 
Mortgage Lending: Good News for the Underserved? 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 369, 372-73 
(2002) (discussing the relative accuracy of automated underwriting and whether it has increased 
flow of mortgage credit to underserved consumers).  
88 A report published by the Bank of International Settlement presents several findings where 
Fintech borrowers perform traditional banks in terms of providing loans to consumers with lower 
credit scores, the report does not explain under what terms the loans are offered. See Leonardo 
Gambacorta et al., How do machine learning and non-traditional data affect credit scoring? New 
evidence from a Chinese fintech firm 4 (BIS Working Paper No. 834, December 2019). 




 3.1.2.  IMPARTIALITY—FROM ALGORITHMIC SCORE TO AN IMPARTIAL  
  LOAN OFFICER 
 
 One of the potential advantages of algorithmic decisions is objectivity and 
neutrality. In theory algorithms should remove human bias from the decision-
making both by using neutral data points and by ensuring that the decision based 
on such data points is not manipulated to advance or perpetuate human bias. 
Nevertheless, the existing literature show a great skepticism toward algorithmic 
neutrality arguing that facially neutral factors may be used as proxy for prohibited 
characteristics, 89 while human biases could be replicated or even amplified by 
seemingly neutral algorithms. 90  As a matter of principle, automated consumer 
credit scoring ensures that loan officers do not insert their biases or malice in the 
decision-making process.    
 
 On many occasions, automated consumer credit scores have proven to be 
an incontrovertible and impartial evidence in claims of discrimination against banks 
in the US. The large body of literature in this field, zealously wanting to ring an 
alarm bell about algorithmic bias and unfairness, ignore some of the instances in 
which consumers have used their algorithmic scores to prove discrimination by 
human loan officers. 
 
 In United States vs Deposit Guaranty National Bank, the defendant bank 
engaged in discriminatory lending practice where “loan officers had broad 
discretion to make override decisions, known as judgmental overrides, for credit-
scored loan applications—that is, decisions to deny credit to applicants who scored 
at or above the stated cutoff score for loan approval (high side overrides) and to 
grant credit to applicants who scored below that cutoff score (low side 
overrides).”91 According to the claim, African American loan applicants were three 
times more likely to be rejected compared to white applicants.92 The court entered 
a settlement order which, among others requirements, required the defendant to 
 
89 Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence 
and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1267 (2020). 
90See Philip Hacker, Teaching Fairness Artificial Intelligence: Existing and Novel Strategies 
against Algorithmic Discrimination under EU Law, 55  COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1143, 1146 
(2020); Johnson et al., supra note 72, at 506; Nicol Turner Lee et al, Algorithmic bias detection 
and mitigation: Best practices and policies to reduce consumer harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-
practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/. 
91United States v. Deposit Guaranty National Bank, No. 3:99CV670, Settlement at 2, (S.D. Miss. 
1999), https://www.justice.gov/crt/housing-and-civil-enforcement-cases-documents-119 (internal 
quotations omitted). 
92Id. 
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establish $3 million compensation trust fund for the victims of its discriminatory 
lending practices.93 
 
 Wells Fargo Bank similarly engaged in a discriminatory lending practice in 
mortgage loan underwriting by placing African American and Hispanic American 
borrowers into subprime loans, “with adverse terms and conditions such as high 
interest rates, excessive fees, pre-payment penalties, and unavoidable future 
payment hikes, when similarly qualified Non-Hispanic white . . . borrowers 
received prime loans.”94 The African American and Hispanic American plaintiffs 
in the dispute had, in some cases, higher credit score than White applicants.95  Wells 
Fargo settled the case for $175 million.96 
 
 In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) secured a settlement of $10.6 million for 
discriminatory lending through redlining from BancorpSouth.97 The story is the 
same—BancorpSouth engaged in discriminatory mortgage loan practice by 
providing loans to Caucasian Americans with about a 622 credit score while 
denying to African-Americans with credit score of 625, and according to the 
allegation with higher income and better credit history. 98 To the author’s best 
knowledge, there are no similar cases reported in the EU. 
 
 The list of cases in which algorithmic credit scores were used to assert 
claims of discrimination could be long.99 The obvious implication of these cases is 
that automated credit scoring may indeed compel financial institutions to uphold 
impartial decision making in loan underwriting. Although things are more complex 
when machine learning techniques come into the picture, the evidence does show 
 
93Id.at 4. 
94 United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, Case 1:12-cv-01150, Doc. 1 at 4 (D.D.C. July 12, 2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/12/wellsfargocomp.pdf. 
95Id.  
96 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo 
Resulting in More Than $175 Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending 
Claims (July 12, 2012). 
97Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Reach Settlement with BancorpSouth Bank to Resolve Allegations of Mortgage Lending 
Discrimination (June 29, 2016). 
98Complaint at ¶ 101, U.S. and Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. BacnoSouth, 1:16-cv-00118-GHD-
DAS (N.D. Miss. 2016). 
99 For example, see the Complaint for the pending litigation in The Fair Housing Center v. Liberty 
Bank, No. 18-cv-1654 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/14/2018/10/Connecticut-Fair-Housing-Center-Inc.-v.-Liberty-Bank-
complaint.pdf.     




that consumers are not always the losers when an impartial and untampered 
algorithm speaks.  
  
 3.1.3.  FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
 
 The third potential advantage of automated consumer credit scoring is 
financial inclusion. Limited amount of research shows that alternative credit 
scoring is financially inclusive, i.e., provides access to financial services to those 
that are considered unscorable, invisible or credit unworthy.100 
 
 The traditional credit scoring system, due to the limited amount of data 
points it utilizes, is considered exclusionary, which could lead to lack of access to 
financial services to millions of citizens.101 The US CFPB estimated in 2015 that 
11% of American consumers to be credit invisible. 102  According to a survey 
conducted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2017, about 8.4 
million households representing roughly 20 million citizens (6 percent of the 
households) were unbanked.103 Although the overall figure in the EU in 2017 is 
relatively lower at 3.6%, there is a non-negligible percentage of consumers with no 
access to financial services in different Member States.104 
 
 With a continuous change in demographics created by migration, the 
difference in income, and opportunity in access to financial services, the issue of 
credit scoring and financial inclusion is likely to become more pertinent. A study 
in access to financial services shows alarming level of discrimination based on 
ethnic origin in the financial industry in the EU Member States.105 A group of 
researchers sent banking related inquires to 1,281 banks in seven EU Member states 
using emails with “domestic names” and “Arabic Names.”106 Their finding showed 
a lower response rate in investment and loan related inquires coming from 
 
100 NICK HENRY & JOHN MORRIS, SCALING UP AFFORDABLE LENDING: INCLUSIVE CREDIT 
SCORING 10-12 (2018).   
101Id.at 12. 
102 KENNETH P. BREVOORT, ET AL., DATA POINT: CREDIT INVISIBLE 6 (2015).  
103See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., THE 2017 NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2017).  
104 The report published by the European Central Bank shows that in the year 2017, there were 
around 10% unbanked households in Italy and Slovakia and 25% of households in Greece 
reporting not to have any financial 
accounts. See Miguel Ampudia & Michael Ehrmann, Financial Inclusion: What’s it Worth? 3, 7 
(Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1990, 2017), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1990.en.pdf. 
105 MATTHIAS STEFAN, ET AL, ETHNICAL DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE: FIELD EVIDENCE FROM THE 
FINANCE INDUSTRY 1-7 (2018).   
106Id. at 1. 
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‘immigrants’ was a result of discrimination.107 In a similar study conducted in 
Sweden that was published in 2016, focused on self-employed immigrants, 
established that self-employed European immigrants and non-European 
immigrants are more likely to be denied loans or be charged higher interest rates 
compared to native applicants, with the situation being worse for non-European 
immigrants. 108  Controlling for different variables that could justify differential 
treatment, the researchers concluded that the difference in terms of accessing loan 
could only be explained by discrimination. 109  In Spain, local banks have 
discriminated against vulnerable categories of consumers (mainly those with lower 
income, technological skills, or financial literacy). 110 Clearly, although not EU 
wide, these evidences shed a light on discrimination based on social or ethnic 
background in financial services in EU Member States. 
  
 Although tackling discrimination is one aspect of fostering it, financial 
inclusion requires financial institutions to actively and responsibly provide 
financial services that are appropriate to the needs of different consumers including 
the vulnerable ones.111 How does automated consumer credit scoring play a part in 
this? Advocates argue that by increasing the type of data that is used to assess the 
consumer’s creditworthiness, automated credit scoring allows financial institutions 
to embrace consumers that are otherwise ignored by financial institutions that use 
traditional (legacy) credit scoring.112 In this regard, empirical evidence shows a 
mixed result. Lemieux and Jagtian, based on empirical studies, found that Fintech 
companies using alternative data provide consumer mortgage to underserved 
communities better than traditional banks.113 By investigating practices of two 
peer-to-peer lending platforms using algorithms for credit risk assessment in the 
Netherlands, Buit concludes that FinTech lenders extend credit to borrowers who 
generally qualify for loan from conventional lenders.114 
 
107Id. 
10869 LINA ALDÉN & MATS HAMMARSTEDT, DECRIMINATION IN THE CREDIT MARKET? ACCESS TO 
FINANCIAL CAPITAL AMONG SELF-EMPLOYED IMMIGRANTS 3-31 (2016).  
109Id. at 5.  
110Beatriz Fernandez-Olit et al., Banks and Financial Discrimination: What Can Be Learnt from 
the Spanish Experience?, 42 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y 303, 319 (2019). 
111Deepali Pant Joshi, Behavioral Insights Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Financial Inclusion and Financial Literacy (June 28, 2011), 
https://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-education/48303408.pdf.   
112Majid Bazarbash, FinTech in Financial Inclusion: Machine Learning Applications in Assessing 
Credit Risk 2, (IMF, Working Paper No. 19/109, 2019).  
113Catharine Lemieux & Julapa Jagtiani, Fintech Lending: Financial Inclusion, Risk Pricing and 
Alternative Information 34 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 17-17, 2017).  
114MARTHA ELISABETH BUIT, CONSUMER PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND THE PROMISE OF 
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 3.1.4. AN OPEN QUESTION? 
 
 The three arguments presented in support of automated consumer credit 
scoring are efficiency, impartiality, and financial inclusion. Automated consumer 
credit scoring is recognized to enhance efficiency through speedy loan processing, 
reduced labor costs, and arguably accurate classification, and prediction. 115 
Illustrating impartiality, several cases involving racial discrimination in the US also 
proved how algorithmic credit scores can be used to safeguard against 
discriminatory loan underwriting. So far, it is not clear whether automated credit 
scoring enhances financial inclusion as more empirical research is needed to 
validate the theory. Nonetheless, automated consumer credit scoring does not need 
to prove itself beneficial on all fronts. Algorithms replace a system where skilled 
operators manually compute credit scores by using various sets of data, which is 
considered cumbersome and costly.116 At the very least, this efficiency benefit of 
automated consumer credit scoring should be assessed against the potential risks.  
 
3.2.  THE RISK OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 
 
 This section provides an in-depth analysis of the risk of automated 
consumer credit scoring. It focuses on two dominant risks (a) inaccuracy, and (b) 
bias and discrimination.   
 
 3.2.1. INACCURACY 
 
 A decision to grant or deny credit is critical both for the lender and the 
consumer. The lender has a legitimate interest in vetting the applicants to grant loan 
only to those who are creditworthy. The consumer’s life may hinge on being 
granted credit. Financing education, a home, motor vehicle, and many other 
important aspects of the consumer’s life in the modern world depend in many cases 
on accessing credit.117 Those who are able to obtain credit have better chance of 
 
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND VULNERABLE CONSUMERS (Cătălin Gabriel Stanescu 
& Asress Adimi Gikay, eds., Routledge, 2020) 188.    
115Sarah Wheeler, Disruptive mortgage automation technology from SoftWorks AI increases lender 
profitability: Trapeze solution delivers true touchless automation, HOUSE WIRE (Mar. 12, 
2019), https://www housingwire.com/articles/48405-disruptive-mortgage-automation-technology-
from-softworks-ai-increases-lender-profitability/.  
116 Gunter, supra note 35, at 445. 
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improving their personal lives whereas those who fail to meet the scoring criteria 
may end up going downhill, because one bad score may lead to a series of events 
that may further deteriorate the consumer’s creditworthiness. 118  Hence, it is 
important that decisions are made with the utmost care and accurately reflect the 
circumstance of the consumer.  
 
 Inaccuracy is a great concern in credit scoring, not only for alternative credit 
scoring but also for traditional scoring system.119 A 2013 FTC report revealed that 
20% of consumers had at least one error on one of their three major credit reports, 
out of which 5% had an implication on their credit opportunity.120 An investigative 
report in the UK consumer credit market published in 2014 showed that 38% of 
consumers who checked their credit report in the last two years had uncovered 
consequential errors in their credit report.121 While it is alarming enough that errors 
in credit report are prevalent, it is even more concerning that correcting errors upon 
the consumer’s request is difficult. Even if the consumer manages to do so, it 
happens only after the consumer has suffered a detriment. Sometimes, correcting 
an error in the consumer’s data inserted and held by a credit bureau might take years 
and could lead to court litigation.122 
 
 Although big data-driven scoring is able to use an aggregate of different 
data, the data or the inference made based on it may be inaccurate because the data 
itself is obsolete or out of context.123 The fact that the consumer has gone through 
personal insolvency a decade ago may be correct data, but it certainly is likely to 
be considered outdated and irrelevant to the current credit risk of the consumer at 
the time of application. If the consumer has gone through financial literacy 
programs and was able to meet his/her financial obligations successfully after the 
insolvency, an adverse decision based on the consumer’s history of insolvency is 
 
118Id.  
119See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 (2012). 
120Press Release, Fed. Trade Commission, In FTC Study, Five Percent of Consumers Had Errors 
on Their Credit Reports That Could Result in Less Favorable Terms for Loans (Feb. 11, 2013). 
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likely to be inaccurate inference. For an algorithm, a history of bankruptcy perfectly 
indicates that the consumer is risky whereas a more nuanced approach with a touch 
of human judgment could lead to a different conclusion. Thus, accuracy, apart from 
incorrect data that may be supplied by a credit bureau, can emerge from an 
inaccurate inference being drawn from correct data.  
 
 3.2.2.  BIAS AND DISCRIMINATION 
 
 Automated consumer credit scoring is not any different from judgmental 
credit scoring in the sense that norms of judgment including biases deeply 
entrenched in the society could affect the decision-making in both cases. 124 
Stereotypical view of or blatant discriminations against a group could be 
implemented using algorithms that, could “replic[ate] and even amplify human 
biases.” 125  Regarding machine learning, Hacker identifies two main causes of 
algorithmic biases: biased training and unequal ground truth.126  Biased training 
occurs from incorrect handling of data, such as implicit bias in assigning value 
(output value) to certain data, or from biased selection of data for training.127 It 
could also result from historically biased training data that issued to train the 
algorithm which is then applied to a particular group of the society which was not 
considered during the machine training phase. 128  According to Hacker, a bias 
 
124For contrary evidence, see Adare et al., who assert that “[f]ace-to-face lenders reject Latinx and 
African-American applications approximately 6% more often than they reject similarly situated 
non-minority applicants for both purchase and refinance loans. In aggregate, our findings suggest 
that from 2009 to 2015, lenders rejected 0.74 to 1.3 million Latinx and African-
American applications that would have been accepted except for discrimination. FinTech lenders, 
on the other hand, do not discriminate at all in the decision to reject or accept a minority loan 
application in our sample. This is consistent with algorithms acting in a profit-maximizing 
manner. Because our findings with respect to rejections must rely on proxies for certain variables 
utilized by the GSEs in approving loans, we note that these results are preliminary. But they 
nevertheless point toward the possibility that fully automated underwriting may reduce the 
incidence of discrimination in loan rejections.” ADAIR MORSE ET AL., CONSUMER-LENDING 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE FINTECH ERA 7 (2019).  
125Nicole Lee Turner et al., Algorithmic Bias Detection and Mitigation: Best Practices and Polices 
to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22, 
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-best-
practices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/. For more information on human and machine 
biases, see generally Jon Kleinberg et al., Human Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q. J. OF 
ECON. 237, 237-93 (2018). 
126Hacker, supra note 90, at 1146. 
127Id. at 1147. 
128Id. at 1148 (“This is precisely what happened in a real case concerning applications to a UK 
medical school. For historical reasons, previously successful candidates happened to be 
predominantly white males; the model thus ranked white males higher when screening new 
candidates.”).  
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resulting from unequal ground truth (the best approximation of reality) occurs when 
a trait that disparately impacts a particular group is used as a substitute variable in 
the decision making.129 This constitutes what is referred to as proxy discrimination, 
which may be a result of conscious decision or implicit bias.130 
 
 While some indications of bias in automated credit scoring are reported,131 
today, there are not many documented cases of internationally discriminatory 
algorithms in the credit industry.132 In 2009, American Express allegedly reduced 
the credit facility of Kevin Johnson, a Black American marketing and 
communication firm owner, although he had reportedly no bad credit history.133 In 
its letter, the company stated that Johnson had shopped in a store which was 
patronized by people with poor payment history, which led to the decision to lower 
his credit facility.134 Since the company did not state the specific store, “the only 
shopping trip [that Johnson could] determine was out of the ordinary was a 
 
129See id. at 1148-49. 
130See id (“. . . simply eliminating sensitive attributes from the model does not guarantee non-
discrimination… redundant encoding makes it both more likely and harder to detect, as 
correlations multiply and discrimination hides behind seemingly neutral factors picked up by the 
algorithm.”).  
131See Will Knight, Biased Algorithms Are Everywhere, and No One Seems to Care, MIT 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (July 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608248/biased-
algorithms-are-everywhere-and-no-one-seems-to-care/ (noting the observation of 
an algorithmic bias author that "even those who know their algorithms are at a risk of bias are 
more interested in the bottom line than in rooting out bias.”); see 
also Nicholas Diakopoulos, What a Report from Germany Teaches Us About Investigating 
Algorithms,  COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Jan. 
10, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/investigating-algorithims-germany-
schufa.php (discussing algorithmic bias of German Schufa score calculation and algorithmic 
accountability reporting as “an attempt to uncover the power wielded by algorithmic decision-
making systems and shed light on their biases, mistakes, or misuse.”).  
132In this regard, there are findings that machine-learning-driven loan underwriting is less 
discriminatory and more inclusive. Researchers at the University of California Berkeley have 
concluded that minority groups in the US, i.e., African-Americans and Latinx, face less 
discrimination in FinTech mortgage lending than in face-to-face mortgage 
lending. Robert P. Bartlett, et al., Consumer-Lending Discrimination in the FinTech Era 2, 4 (UC 
Berkeley Pub. Law, Research 
Paper, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3063448.   
133See Ron Lieber, American Express Kept a (Very) Watchful Eye on Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/31/your-money/credit-and-debit-
cards/31money.html; Carrie Teegardin, Whatever Happened to Kevin D. Johnson, Part 
of Credit Card Debate, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Aug. 11, 2012), 
https://www.ajc.com/business/whatever-happened-kevin-johnson-part-credit-card-
debate/cUneC23EknwhzHKe1nP4pI/.  
134“Other customers who have used their card at establishments where you recently shopped have 
a poor repayment history with American Express.” Teegardin, supra note 133. 




September visit to a Wal-Mart in Southeast Atlanta. It was the first time he had 
used his American Express card at that store.” 135 Kevin Johnson’s story does not 
conclusively prove intentional discrimination. Moreover, publicly available 
evidence does not show whether the company took factors other than shopping 
pattern into account.  
 
 In 2019, the Finnish Data Protection Authority issued a decision against a 
credit company, Svea Ekonomi, for setting its algorithmic credit risk assessment to 
automatically reject credit applicants over a certain age (the applicant, Mr. Krister 
Linden, was age 83 by the relevant date). 136 This case shows a clear intent to 
discriminate against certain applicants based on age, executed by Svea Ekonomi, 
which is a prohibited practice in the EU. 137  Nevertheless, the practice is not 
pervasive and systemic in the credit industry.  
 
 3.2.3. THE RISKS OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT—A RECAP 
 
 The preceding sections have examined the benefits and challenges of 
automated consumer credit scoring. Inaccuracy and bias/discrimination are 
identified as two important challenges. While literature proposes technical 
solutions to tackle them,138 this article compares the solutions available in the EU 
and the US.  
 
 The US has not implemented specific law governing automated consumer 
credit scoring, and yet, there are legal rules responding to the phenomenon 
providing comparable consumer protection. With the aim of proving that the US 
 
135Chris Cuomo, et al., ‘GMA' Gets Answers: Some Credit Card Companies Financially Profiling 
Customers, ABC NEWS (Jan. 28, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/TheLaw/gma-answers-
credit-card-companies-financially-profiling-customers/story?id=6747461.    
136Finnish DPA Ordered a Company to Change their Data Processing Practises, GDPR 
REGISTER (May 22, 2019), https://www.gdprregister.eu/gdpr/data-processing-practises/.   
137The EU Consumer Credit Directive, Recital 45 professes to incorporate the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Directive 2008/48, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 April 2008 on Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council 
Directive 87/102/EEC, 2008 O.J. (L 133) 66; See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 3 (including articles on protection of personal data, right 
to property, and non-discrimination). The applicability of EU non-discrimination law in the 
consumer credit market is well-established. See generally IRIS BENOHR, EU CONSUMER LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 130 (2013).  
138See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should 
Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 703-05 (2017) (arguing for 
addressing potential bias and discrimination at the state of training the algorithm through various 
techniques in addition to through rules that govern the machine learning decision at the stage of 
deployment). 
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has flexible consumer credit laws responding to the risk of automated consumer 
credit underwriting, comparable to the one in the EU, the ensuing section examines 
the most pertinent legal rules in the two jurisdictions. 
 
4. EFFECTIVE CONSUMER PROTECTION IN AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT 
SCORING IN THE EU AND THE US 
 
 Legal literature has maintained that consumers are protected better in the 
EU in the field of automated credit scoring than their US counterparts.139 Hertza 
provides an overview of the key provisions of the GDPR that he claims provide 
stronger consumer protection related to access to credit, emphasizing GDPR 
provisions governing consent and transparency. 140  Before examining the 
requirements of consent and transparency in the EU and the US, it is necessary to 
first analyze the GDPR’s rules regarding the general prohibition of individual ADM 
and the exceptions thereof as consent and transparency requirements emerge from 
these rules.  
 
4.1.  GDPR’S GENERAL PROHIBITION OF SOLELY (INDIVIDUAL) ADM 
 
 The GDPR establishes that the data subject has the right not to be subjected 
solely to ADM that produces legal effects concerning them or similarly 
significantly affects them.141  There are three exceptions to this prohibition of solely 
ADM. Pursuant to these exceptions, a solely ADM with legal effect or a similarly 
significant effect is permitted first, with the consent of the consumer, and second 
when the ADM is necessary for the formation or performance of a contract.142 In 
both cases, the data controller must put in place measures to safeguard the data 
subjects’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests including the right to obtain 
human intervention, express their point of view, and contest the decision.143 Third, 
a solely automated decision is permitted if authorized by EU law or law of a 
Member State to which the data controller is a subject.144 
 
 The GDPR’s general prohibition of purely ADM including machine 
learning decisions presents three main challenges. First, if consumers are to be 
requested to provide consent for ADM regarding all matters (as consent is one of 
the requirements), it creates an unnecessary burden on businesses that should solicit 
 
139Hertza, supra note 10, at 1730.  
140Id. at 1729-41.  
141 GDPR at Art. 22(1). 
142 GDPR at Art. 22(1) & (2). 
143 GDPR at Art. 22(3).  
144 GDPR at Art. 22(2) (b). 




consent even when the risk involved in applying ADM in question is appreciably 
low. The consent requirement has also other practical challenges examined in detail 
later (see infra § 4.2.1). Second, the GDPR does not provide a guideline on when a 
decision is necessary for the formation or performance of a contract, which may 
lead to uncertainty for businesses and consumers alike. Third, the possibility for 
allowing ADM if authorized by the Member States results in inconsistent 
implementation in different Member States.  
 
 According to a report published in 2019, only nine Member states used the 
derogation provision by allowing ADM without the consumer’s consent in certain 
instances.145 Although the other Member States may implement the derogation rule 
in the future,146 the uncertainty this may cause to businesses operating in different 
Member States cannot be underestimated. This derogation rule can also be 
implemented to undermine consumer rights. The way in which this rule is 
implemented in Germany and the UK clearly demonstrates how a country may 
implement stringent or loose rules permitting ADM without the consumer’s prior 
consent although not making the consumer better off in either case.  
 
 In Germany, solely ADM is allowed when consented to by the consumer or 
when necessary for the formation or performance of a contract as permitted under 
Article 22(2) (a) &(c) of the GDPR.147 Germany implemented Article 22(2) (b) to 
allow ADM, i.e., without the consumer’s consent only in case of insurance service 
contracts where the request of the individual (consumer) is granted. 148  This 
provision under German GDPR implementing law is interpreted to apply, among 
others, to cases of reimbursement and compensation under an insurance policy.149 
This approach limits solely ADM to two cases. The first one is pursuant to the 
insurance service contract where the outcome of the decision is positive (the request 
of the data subject was granted).150 The second one is where the decision is “based 
on the application of binding rules of remuneration for therapeutic treatment and 
 
145Access Now, One year under the EU GDPR: An Implementation Progress Report- State of the 
Play, Analysis and Recommendations 10 (May 2019), 
https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2019/06/One-Year-Under-GDPR.pdf (noting that 
Germany “provides for sectorial exceptions, notably in the insurance context. Automated 
decisions can be used without individual consent and appeal mechanisms if the individual’s 
request is granted (e.g., receives the full value of a claim).”). 
146Id. at 9. 
147 Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated decision-making in the EU Member States: The right to 
explanation and other “suitable safeguards” in the national legislations, Computer Law & 
Security Review Volume 35(5), 1-26 (2019) at 7.  
148 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz vom 30. Juni 2017 (BGBl. I S. 2097).translated in 
https://www.gesetze hereafter” BDSD.” 
149 See Gianclaudio Malgieri, supra note 147, at 7. 
150 BDSG at Art. 37(1) (1).  
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the data controller takes suitable measures in the event that the request is not 
granted in full, to safeguard the data subject's legitimate interests, at least the right 
to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point 
of view and to contest the decision.”151 In this case, the data controller has the duty 
to inform “the data subject of these rights no later than the notification indicating 
that the data subject’s request will not be granted in full.”152 
 
 The German approach that restricts solely ADM to insurance service 
contracts can certainly be regarded as a cautious approach that reduces the potential 
adverse effects of algorithmic decisions. However, it also unnecessarily restricts 
algorithmic decisions even in cases where the risk of harm could be appreciably 
low and could stifle innovation. There are countless scenarios in which a fully 
ADM may lead to a positive outcome for the data subject. Under the current 
German approach, individual ADM is not allowed even under those circumstances 
because of how Germany implemented the GDPR. To be fair, the exclusive focus 
on the implementation of the GDPR does not provide a complete picture of 
permitted cases of fully ADM in Germany. In the realm of administrative decisions, 
ADM is allowed in tax assessment in Germany based on specific statutes.153 The 
scope of permitted cases of a solely automated decision can also be expanded by 
law as the very purpose of GDPR Article 22(2) (b) seems to achieve this— allowing 
Member States to evaluate sectors/cases in which they want to allow solely ADM 
and authorize it by law. Nevertheless, the choice of insurance service contracts, no 
matter what the justification, does not seem to be reasonable. 
 
 The UK approach is on the other extreme. In the UK, GDPR Article 22(2) 
(b) is implemented more liberally. Accordingly, significant fully automated 
decisions, meaning decisions that produce a legal effect or similarly significant 
effect on the data subject, which are not based on the consent of the data subject or 
necessary for the formation or performance of contract are allowed in any sector 
subject to ex post facto procedural safeguards.154 
 
 Pursuant to the relevant provision of the UK Data Protection Act (2018), a 
fully automated decision is permitted provided that, (a) the data controller, as soon 
as reasonably practicable, notifies the data subject in writing that a decision has 
 
151 BDSG at Art. 37(1) (2). 
152 Id. at Art. 37(1) (2).  
153Marlies van Eck, Automated administrative decisions and the law: Governments are using 
computers to make decisions in individual cases. How is this practice regulated? (September 
2018), https://automatedadministrativedecisionsandthelaw.wordpress.com/2018/09/03/automated-
decisions-and-administrative-law-germany/  
154 UK Data Protection Act (2018) at Art. 14.  




been taken based solely on automated processing.155 “The data subject may, before 
the end of the period of 1 month beginning with receipt of the notification, request 
the data controller to—(i) reconsider the decision, or (ii) take a new decision that is 
not based solely on automated processing.”156 
 
 Within a maximum of one month, subject to extension by two more months 
for a justifiable reason, the data controller must (a) consider the request, including 
any information provided by the data subject that is relevant to it, (b) comply with 
the request, and (c) by notice in writing inform the data subject of— (i) the steps 
taken to comply with the request, and (ii) the outcome of complying with the 
request.157 
 
 The provisions of the UK Data Protection Act implementing article 22(2) 
(b) of the GDPR in contrast with the sectoral approach in Germany,158 adopts a 
more liberal approach, permitting fully automated decisions in all sectors subject 
to ex post facto procedural safeguards. While the German approach restricts 
automated decisions needlessly, the UK approach could potentially expose 
consumers and the public to arbitrary algorithmic decisions even in cases where the 
risk of harm is high. The ex post facto procedural safeguards may be abused by data 
controllers who may not necessarily disclose that the decision in question is made 
by an algorithm. If this happens, there is no way for the consumer to exercise the 
right to request for reconsideration of the decision.  
 
 In the UK, algorithmic decisions could be used in sensitive areas where the 
public has a strong interest in ensuring accuracy, fairness, and transparency. In 
2019, legal action was instituted against the Home Office by the Joint Council for 
the Welfare of Immigrants, due to its use of an algorithm that allegedly 
discriminated against visa applicants based on race/nationality.159 This algorithm 
was allegedly used to classify visa applicants according to risk as red, amber, and 
green.160 The Home Office decided to scrap the algorithm in question in 2020. 
 
155 Id. at Art. 14(4) (a). 
156 Id. at Art. 14(4) (b). 
157 Id. at Art. 14(5). 
158 See Gianclaudio Malgieri, supra note 147, at 7.  
159 Henry McDonald, ‘Home Office to scrap 'racist algorithm' for UK visa applicants’, The 
Guardian (August 4, 2020) https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/aug/04/home-office-to-
scrap-racist-algorithm-for-uk-visa-applicants  
160 The Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants, ‘We won! Home Office to stop using racist visa 
algorithm’ (2020) https://www.jcwi.org.uk/news/we-won-home-office-to-stop-using-racist-visa-
algorithm 
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Several local Councils use algorithms in decisions relating to welfare benefits.161 It 
is questionable whether the existing procedural safeguards are sufficient to protect 
consumers from potentially arbitrary decisions made even in loan underwriting. At 
the very least, if the decision-makers comply with the duty to inform the consumer 
of the nature of the decision, the consumer might be able to contest the decision 
and secure human intervention, although the consumer might lose based on 
procedural error (failure to contest the decision in a month) or may carry a 
significant financial burden while challenging the decision including before a court.   
 
 The UK approach to the implementation of the GDPR clearly demonstrates 
that the EU’s much commended legal regime does not necessarily protect the 
consumer from ADM as it can be implemented to allow solely ADM in a broad 
range of areas. A non-complying data controller could utilize ADM without the 
consent of the data controller and without establishing that the decision is necessary 
for the formation or performance of a contract under Article 14(UK), by putting in 
place procedural safeguards whether or not those procedural safeguards are 
genuinely meant to protect the consumer. In the case of machine learning decisions, 
the safeguards may not be adequately implemented in the first place (see infra § 
5.1) Such as system cannot be proposed as a model system of law for consumer 
protection. In the proceeding sub-section, the requirements of consent and 
transparency that are regarded as instrumental in protecting the consumer are 
analyzed.  
 
4.2. CONSENT AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
 The GDPR is commended for giving data subjects control over their 
personal data,162 in part through strict consent rules. Under the GDPR, the provision 
that consent should be secured for one or more specified reasons is one of six 
provisions, one of which must apply for the processing of personal data to be 
legal.163 The GDPR requires that if consent is given in a “written declaration which 
also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner 
which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily 
 
161 Sarah Marsh, ‘One in three councils using algorithms to make welfare decisions’, The 
Guardian (October 15, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/oct/15/councils-using-
algorithms-make-welfare-decisions-benefits 
162I van Ooijen & Helena U. Vrabec, Does the GDPR Enhance Consumers’ Control over Personal 
Data? An Analysis from a Behavioural Perspective, 42 J. OF CONSUMER POL’Y91, 92-93, 103-
04 (2019) (assessing the degree to which the GDPR gives consumers control over their data, 
finding that the GDPR does enhance individual control, but contains deficiencies that self-
regulatory instruments may regulate).  
163See 2016 O.J. (L 119) 36 (listing the six factors of lawful personal data processing under GDPR 
Article 6(1), one of which must apply).  




accessible form, using clear and plain language.” 164  More notably, ADM is 
permitted if necessary for the formation or performance of a contract, authorized 
by law or consented to by the data subject.165 The consumer also has the right to 
withdraw their consent at any time.166 In arguing that these consent rules enhance 
better consumer protection in the EU, Hertza states: 
 
While recognizing that there is no silver bullet to 
solve the difficult issues facing the consumer credit 
industry, this section identifies some ways in which 
the GDPR could inspire consumer credit legislation 
reforms. Big data and AI could increase the number 
of people that have access to credit. However, the 
discriminatory impact of the new technologies will 
outweigh the benefits, unless consumer credit 
regulation grants consumers access rights to the data 
used to determine their creditworthiness, and also 
grants consumers the right to deny access to certain 
personal data. The first steps required to achieve this 
goal are to extinguish the CRA versus non-CRA 
distinction up to a certain point, and to strengthen 
consent requirements and the right to refuse access 
to personal data.167 
 
 4.2.1. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS APPROACH TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE  
  EU AND CONSENT 
 
 Data protection law in Europe is based on the conception that data 
protection is a fundamental right,168 something the GDPR upholds.169 Thus, the 
stringent consent requirements of the GDPR are crafted in this context. 
Nevertheless, the notion that stringent consent requirements would enhance 
consumer protection in algorithmic credit scoring is based on abstract analysis of 
the law. First, the EU consumers do not benefit from consent requirements as much 
 
1642016 O.J. (L 119) 37.  
165Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European 
Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMMC’N 
TECH. L. 65, 91 (2019).  
1662016 O.J. (L 119) 37.  
167Hertza, supra note 10, at 1734 (emphasis added). 
168See STEFANO RODOTÀ, REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION? 77, 80-81 (S. Gutwirth et al. eds., 
2009); Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y. U. L. REV. 771, 773-
74 (2019).  
169 Hoofnagle et al., supra note 165, at 79, 89. 
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as assumed or expected. Second, the fact that the consumer’s data is obtained by a 
financial institution with consent has no causal link to how their data is processed 
in many cases. 
 
 Several factors contribute to the ineffectiveness of EU data protection 
consent rules. Research suggests that due to the sophistication of privacy policies 
and the complex systems of data collection coupled with the consumers’ limited 
cognitive ability to process information, consumers do not have sufficient 
informational control.170 First, data collection consent forms (terms and conditions) 
or privacy policies are adhesion contracts where the data subjects have no power to 
bargain. 171  Despite the GDPR requirement that consent be specific, informed, 
unambiguous, given freely, and entail affirmative action by the consumer, 
researchers argue that there are still challenges that weaken the consumers’ 
control.172 At the stage of collection, due to cognitive limitations, as well as the 
large volume of information, consumers are not able to properly filter and process 
information to make informed decisions. 173  Even if privacy agreements were 
negotiable, consumers would not have the time to adequately scrutinize them due 
to information overload and challenges to understanding technical jargon.174 
 
 A 2015 survey conducted by Eurobarometer (under the request of the 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers) shows that 
the majority of respondents do not read privacy policies because they are too long, 
or because they are unclear or too difficult to understand, while a small percentage 
of the respondents simply assume that the law provides protection, or find it 
sufficient that there is a privacy policy on the website of the data controller.175 This 
means that the majority of consumers could sign a privacy policy that might allow 
ADM without knowing it.  
 
 
170 Ooijen & Vrabec, supra note 162, at 96.  
171See Michiel Rhoen, Beyond Consent: Improving Data Protection Through Consumer Protection
 Law, 5 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 3 (2016).   
172Ooijen & Vrabec, supra note 162 at 100, 103-04.    
173Id. at 94-95.  
174Id. at 95 ("a Norwegian campaign-group established that it took almost 32 hours to read the 
terms and conditions of 33 representative smartphone apps . . . Note that this was solely the time it 
took to read the texts, let alone reflecting on the consequences of agreement to such policies."). 
175Special Eurobarometer 431: Data Protection Report, at 87-88 (June 
2015), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_431_en.pdf.  




 One year after the GDPR was implemented, Eurobarometer published 
another survey in June 2019.176 According to this survey conducted in all EU 
Member states, 37% of the participants responded that they do not read online 
privacy policies at all, while 47% and 13% read them partially and fully 
respectively.177 Those who read privacy policies partially or do not read them at all 
indicated that privacy policies are too long (66%) unclear and difficult to 
understand (31%).178 Some responded that it is sufficient for them to know that the 
entity they are dealing with has privacy policy(17%) while others believe that they 
would be protected by law anyway(15%) whereas others believe that websites will 
not honor privacy terms(10%).179 
 
 Privacy policies have gotten more complex as business methods become 
more sophisticated and businesses have become more aggressive with the 
realization of the economic value of personal data and the increased ability to 
collect it, process it, and make predicative analysis at a cheaper cost. 180  So, 
consumers accept terms and conditions for multiple online apps and transactions 
with no desire to waste their time reading complex non-negotiable privacy policies. 
Financial institutions can amend their terms and conditions unilaterally and send an 
electronic contract that the user has no meaningful control over. Those who read 
and understand can do little to change terms they do not like.  
 
 Recently, the CJEU handed down a judgment which specifies that internet 
sites cannot set cookies policies to require positive action for the consumer to opt-
out of cookie based-tracking of the consumer behavior.181 The judgment should 
address the rampant and continuous tracking of consumers’ behavior for marketing 
purposes by requiring the consumer to untick pre-selected checkboxes.182 When 
consumers that browse the internet are subject to surveillance by private companies 
who can access personal data and share it with third parties unless the consumer 
goes through pre-selected boxes to untick them, it is naïve to think that consent 
requirement is protecting consumers in the EU. Even after the judgment of the 
 




178Id. at 51. 
179Id. 
180See Jennifer Shore & Jill Steinman, Did you really agree to that? The evolution of Facebook’s 
privacy, TECH. SCI., (Aug. 10, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015081102.    
181See Case C-673/17, Planet49, 2019 EU:C:2019:801. 
182See Klaus Wiedemann, The ECJ’s Decision in ‘‘Planet49’’ (Case C-673/17): A Cookie Monster 
or Much Ado About Nothing?, 51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. L. 543, 544 (2020).  
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CJEU, the cookies practices have not changed in the EU based on the author’s 
personal encounter with hundreds of websites on weekly basis.  
 
 Based on the Eurobarometer report and consumer behavior, as well business 
practice, it is fair to conclude that overwhelming majority of the consumers have 
no control over their data. The stringent consent requirement of the GDPR is 
nothing more than a procedural requirement that ignores substantive consideration 
of whether the consumer has real opportunity to bargain and change the privacy 
related clauses.183 Thus scholars who provide a cursory overview of the GDPR’s 
provisions without investigating the actual practice have the onus of proving how 
the consent requirement protects the consumer in automated consumer credit 
scoring. 
 
 4.2.2. MARKET ORIENTED APPROACH TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE US  
  AND NOTICE AND CHOICE 
 
 In the US, data privacy is treated as a good that is subject to trading in the 
market rather than a right that merits a constitutional protection.184 Nevertheless, a 
consent requirement, although not consistent across states and sectors and 
admittedly softer, is not entirely lacking. Data Privacy law in the US is sectoral185 
and governed by a combination of federal and state laws. The sectoral nature of US 
data privacy law is also a key feature of privacy law at state levels. For instance, 
California has different privacy laws for different sectors that require consent 
(notice and choice) for data collection and sharing with third parties,186 despite 
California implementing a new privacy act.187 
 
 US privacy law is different from its EU counterpart in its philosophical 
foundation which prioritizes innovation over protection of data privacy rights, 
narrow definition of privacy harm and lack of a single enforcement agency, to 
mention the most important facets.188 In line with this, consent mechanism in the 
 
183See Rhoen, supra note 171, at 6; see also STEPHEN WEATHERILL, EU CONSUMER LAW AND 
POLICY 85 (2d ed. 2013).  
184See Paul M. Schwartz & Kark-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 117, 132 (2017).  
185See Schwartz, supra note 30 at 903-04.  
186See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (2006); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4050 (2012). 
187 The California Constitutional Privacy Act applies to businesses with gross annual revenue or 
more than $25 million or businesses that buy, receive or sell the personal information of 50,000 or 
more consumers, households or devices. Compared to the GDPR, this is an odd way of designing 
privacy law that excludes many actors that can engage in invasion and breach of consumer 
privacy. See CAL. CONS. PRIV. ACT §1798.140(d) (A) & (B).  
188See Barret, supra note 30, at 1065-81. 




US, more accurately referred to as notice and choice 189 is regarded as soft.190 
Companies generally provide notice to the consumer on take-it-or-leave-it basis191 
whereas on paper, drafting adhesive privacy policy is not allowed under the GDPR.  
 
 In the field of consumer financial services, consent requirement is relatively 
comprehensive in the US as well. The GLBA has provisions that require financial 
institutions to protect the confidentiality and security of consumers’ data, and 
requires them to provide notice to the consumer if they wish to disclose information 
to a third party.192 The GLBA applies to financial institutions that provide loan, 
investment and insurance services. 193  It imposes an obligation on financial 
institutions to provide notice about the type of non-public personal information 
collected about the consumer, the origin of such information, as well as affiliated 
and non-affiliated third parties with whom the information may be shared. 194 
Financial institutions are also obliged to inform the consumer of their right to opt 
out of the personal data sharing with non-affiliated third parties through a 
reasonable method and in a reasonable time.195 Another relevant federal statute that 
governs consent is the FCRA which applies to Credit Reporting Agencies. The 
FCRA notice rule allows the consumer to opt out of disclosure by credit reporting 
agencies of their personal data to third parties.196 
 
 One of the most significant US legal rules on data privacy is found in the 
FTC Act. Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the agency the power to institute 
enforcement actions for unfair and deceptive trade practices.197 The FTC has used 
its authority under section 5 to sanction data controllers for misrepresenting their 
privacy policy including not honoring them or not disclosing the exact scope of 
collection of the consumers’ data.198 
 
189See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1880 (2013).  
190Id. at 1071. 
191Id. at 1073. 
192Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 501-505, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).  
193See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3) (2012).  
194See How to Comply with the Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N 7, (2000), https://www ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/how-comply-privacy-consumer-financial-information-rule-gramm.  
195Id. at 9.  
196See Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED. DEP. INS. CO., (2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/8/viii-6.1.pdf.   
19715 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) & (2). With respect to banks and financial institutions, this provision is 
enforced by other supervisory authorities including the Office of Currencies and Comptrollers.  
198See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Consent Order in the Matter of My Space LLC, File No. 102 3058, 
3 (2012), https://www ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/05/120508myspaceorder.p
 




 The review of privacy notice rules in the US leads to three main 
conclusions. First, although the US notice system is critiqued for leaving room for 
consumers to accept adhesive contracts, the system does give the consumer the right 
not to disclose their data, unless the specific purpose for data collection, processing, 
and sharing are disclosed. In this context, consumers need to consent to ADM for 
a specific purpose. Second, the default rule in various sectoral statutes is that the 
data controller may share the data with third parties unless the consumer decides to 
opt out. This makes the consent system weaker in the US than the EU.199 
 
 Overall, in the US, although the requirement of consent is certainly not as 
stringent as in the EU in dictating the manner of framing the consent form, the US 
does protect the consumer in the field of consumer credit scoring. Even if there 
were gaps in consent requirement, the GDPR does not serve as a benchmark 
because even under its umbrella, consumers only have the illusion of control over 
their personal data. Only a handful of consumers may prevent businesses from 
getting their data for purposes they do not approve of, and only a tiny minority 
might negotiate to change privacy policies (if at all). Finally, only a handful of 
consumers would be able to bring legal action for breach of their privacy rights.  
 
 Last but not the least, even if it were assumed that US financial institutions 
could make automated decisions with consent obtained through adhesion contracts, 
that does not allow them to make inaccurate or discriminatory decisions. They 
cannot refuse to provide explanation to the consumers ex post facto. There are 
multiple effective sanctions imposed on CRAs for inaccurate reporting in the US 
which clearly demonstrates that consent in data collection and sharing does not 






df; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, Agreement on Consent in the Matter of Searr Holding 
Management, File No. 082 3099 4-5 (2009).  
199OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE 
OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) (“Disclosure is a ritual to be endured: patients are 
“consented,” borrowers sign their way through closings, smartphone users “accept” terms, and 
Internet users are informed of privacy policies through linked scrolls. How can we not alter the 
white noise of disclosure? Lawmakers then turn up the volume to get our attention, and we close 
our ears to the din. In short, mandated disclosure seems plausible only on logically reasonable but 
humanly false assumptions. When buying software online, how many people click to read the 
terms of sale, much less read them, much less try to understand them, and much less succeed?”).  
200See discussion infra section 4.2.2. 




4.3 TRANSPARENCY AND AUTOMATED CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING 
 
 4.3.1. THEORIES OF TRANSPARENCY 
 
 Another facet of the regulation of algorithmic decision-making is 
transparency which is regarded as an important component of ensuring algorithmic 
accountability. This sub-section overviews various theories of transparency in 
ADM and analyzes the legal rules on transparency in the EU and the US. 
 
 The debate regarding the scope of transparency required in automated credit 
scoring or even its necessity at all is polarized. 201  The reason for demanding 
transparency in ADM is ensuring that the decision maker explains its decision-
making system to the consumer, the public and is held accountable for adverse 
decisions. 202  Transparency enhances consumer confidence in the system and 
provides the basis for accountability.203 Nevertheless, how much should decision 
maker disclose? Is it possible to explain algorithmic decision in all circumstances? 
On these questions, there are three main theories that may serve as a basis for 
methodical analysis of this issue: (1) the black box, (2) the disparate impact, and 
(3) the opacity theories.  
 
 This article argues that neither the GDPR, nor the relevant rules in the US 
promote an optimal level of consumer protection because of the problem of 
explainability in machine learning.  
 
  A. The Black Box Theory 
 
 The black box theory has been dominant in legal literature and merits a 
serious scrutiny due to its uncompromising demand for transparency. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, the theory is pioneered, or at least expounded by Frank 
Pasquale who describes an algorithmic decision as a system where the input and 
output is known but how one becomes the other is unknown and calls for 
transparency in the logic of algorithms. 204  To achieve transparency under this 
theory, the decision makers should disclose, not only the input data used for the 
decision but also the output as well as the decisions tree (the weighing process for 
 
201 In one camp, scholars call for complete transparency. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK 
BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 7 
(2015). On the other extreme, some scholars consider opacity to be the guiding principle for 
automated decisions. See Kroll et al, supra note 76, at 664-713.  
202See generally PASQUALE, supra note 201. 
203Id.  
204See PASQUALE, supra note 201, at 8; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The 
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 67 (2016).  
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various variables) that should provide a clear account of how the algorithm 
functions and eventually to ensure algorithmic accountability 205  as well as 
algorithm auditing,206 and transparency (as an end in itself).207 
 
 The black box approach has at least three essential requirements. First, the 
existence of ADM must be disclosed to the consumer.208 Second, disclosure in 
cases of actual decision give information regarding the input and output as well as 
the logic involved in getting one from the other.209 Third, the default rule of trade 
secret law that protects proprietary algorithms should change from assumption of 
secrecy to expectation of people’s right to know.210 
 
 The black box approach has many objectives. Among others, it aims to 
subject algorithms to scrutiny of consumers impacted by algorithmic decisions and 
to allow public authorities to oversee algorithms through testing and auditing.211 
The black box theory aims to enhance the maximum transparency possible, whether 
it can achieve its objective is questionable. To be sure, the legal system in the EU 
and the US is not prepared to force disclosure of computer source codes to the 
consumer, to public enforcement authorities and to the judiciary.212 Neither is the 
default rule of secrecy for proprietary algorithms reversed in both jurisdictions. 
Opponents of this view also point out the impracticality of the approach for several 
reasons (see infra 4.2.1.B).  
 
  B. The Opacity Theory 
 
 The opacity school of thought, holding that transparency in algorithmic 
decision making is not necessary, argues that algorithmic fairness can be achieved 
 
205See Kroll et al, supra note 76, at 664-713.  
206Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 189, 197 (2017). 
207See Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Prediction, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1504-70 (2013); 
see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 201, at 20; Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to 
Automated Authority, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 235, 235-6 (2011); Edith 
Ramirez, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Institute Aspen Forum: Privacy Challenges in 
the Era of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard’s Chair, FED. TRADE COMM’N 8 (Aug. 19, 
2013) https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/privacy-challenges-big-
data-view-lifeguard%E2%80%99s-chair/130819bigdataaspen.pdf.  
208See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 204. 
209See id. at 26; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249–
1313 (2007); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014). 
210See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 204, at 21.  
211Id. at 26. 
212Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.713 
(2000). 




without being fully legally transparent.213 According to this view, full transparency 
is not useful on the grounds that it (a) could enable people “game the system”,214 
(b) is impossible due to trade secret law protecting algorithms,215 and (c) may not 
necessarily lead to the understanding of how the algorithm functions.216 In the 
context of machine learning, the theory holds that full disclosure is unhelpful 
because with every query and dataset, the software updates its decision making, 
and hence the existing decision rules become outdated, thereby rendering the 
disclosed information purposeless.217 
 
 The opacity theory suggests procedural regularity in ADM can be achieved 
by technical tools of software testing conducted feasibly only by industry experts 
and possibly in a self-regulation setting. 218 The opacity theory emphatically 
advocates for secrecy in algorithmic decision-making.219 
 
 From the consumer’s perspective, the technical tools of transparency 
suggested by the opacity theory do not enhance true transparency. One of the 
proposed cryptographic techniques of transparency is Zero-Knowledge Proof 
(ZKP) —"protocols that enable one entity (called the prover) to convince another 
entity (called the verifier) of the validity of a mathematical statement, without 
revealing anything beyond the assertion of the statement.”220 In its ideal function 
ZKP is supposed to ensure that the public knows that a decision is made according 
to a specific procedure and would have a specific outcome, and the decision maker 
 
213Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 657-60; see also Zarsky, supra note 207, at 1504-70. 
214Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 657-60; see also Christian Sandvig, et al, Auditing Algorithms: 
Research Methods for Detecting Discrimination on Internet Platforms, Data and Discrimination: 
Converting Critical Concerns into Productive Inquiry9 (2014), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b722/7cbd34766655dea10d0437ab10df3a127396.pdf?_ga=2.767
79484.892963938.1581377623-552105405.1575505643 (“A major problem is that the public 
interest disclosure of just algorithms might be likely to produce serious negative consequences. On 
many platforms the algorithm designers constantly operate a game of cat-and-mouse with those 
who would abuse or ‘game’ their algorithm. These adversaries may themselves be criminals (such 
as spammers or hackers) and aiding them could conceivably be a greater harm than detecting 
unfair discrimination in the platform itself.”). 
215See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal 
Justice System, 70 STANFORD L. REV.1344 (2018). 
216 Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 638; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: 
A Guide to Algorithm and the Law, 31 HARVARD J. L. & TECH. 1, 33-34 (2018). 
217 Kroll et al., supra note 76, at 660 (“Online machine learning systems update their decision 
rules after every query, meaning that any disclosure will be obsolete as soon as it is made.”). 
218 Id. at 662-69. 
219Id. at 662. 
220 Rafael Pass, Alternative Variants of Zero-Knowledge Proofs (2004) (Licentiate Thesis, Cornell 
Computer Science). 
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is supposed to demonstrate that information without revealing anything that is 
considered a secret.221 
 
 If the decision making is challenged before court, an oversight body can 
compel the decision maker to demonstrate that the decision complies with the 
commitment they made publicly.222 To summarize, the opacity theory calls for a 
default secrecy rule with limited transparency, implemented in a form of self-
certification. As conceded by the proponents themselves, many of the tools are 
expensive,223 and none of them encourage the disclosure of the source code to the 
public without putting in place protective mechanisms to guard trade secrets.224 
 
 The opacity theory is flawed on several levels. Its key drawback is the 
excessive dependence on self-regulation where the regulated entities’ words and 
commitments are to be taken for granted until a consumer challenges a given 
decision-making process, at which point it would be subjected to third-party 
scrutiny. This theory is only as good as what companies are willing to do to be 
transparent.  
 
 There is some evidence from regulatory history that self-regulation or self-
certification is not effective model of regulation. Before the 2008 global financial 
crisis, one of the credit rating agencies, Moody’s, was reported to have had an error 
in its rating model—leading to triple A rating for assets with higher default risk.225 
Rather than correcting the error and rating the asset accordingly, Moody’s only 
adjusted its model to justify the previous mistaken rating. 226  Credit Rating 
Agencies came under the spotlight largely due to the magnitude of the financial 
crisis. It is difficult to understand why complex cryptographic commitments or 
other technical tools of transparency will not be used by credit scoring companies 






221 Kroll et al., supra note 76 at 668 (arguing that ZKP “allows decisionmakers to build audit logs, 
which can be verified by the public to confirm that the decisionmaker applied the appropriate 
policy to the correct input in order to reach the stated outcome, all without revealing the decision 
policy itself and without revealing private data that might be included in the input or outcome.”). 
222Id. at 668-69. 
223Id. at 661. 
224Id. at 672-73.  
225 Claire Hill, Why Did Rating Agencies Do Such a Bad Job Rating Subprime Securities?, 71 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 585, 592 (2010).  
226Id. at 593.  





  C. The Disparate Impact Theory 
 
 The disparate impact theory assumes that full transparency is not necessary, 
while also rejecting opacity. Thus, it demands the disclosure of the input and output 
in the scoring system.227 Chander argues that unlike what can be read in Pasquale’s 
Black Box, the transparency in algorithm design, what is needed is transparency in 
output and input. 228  His argument is that in the mysterious functioning of 
algorithms, it is difficult to understand how a given input becomes an output, and 
serves as the basis of a decision, whereas it is possible to determine what inputs are 
used and what impacts they have.229 He explains that by focusing on the input and 
output, disparate impact of the outcome can be judged, and that is the only factor 
that should be taken into account in deciding whether an algorithmic decision is 
discriminatory or has a disparate impact on a specific group of consumers.230 
 
 4.3.2.  TRANSPARENCY—THE RULES IN THE EU AND THE US 
 
 There are appreciable differences in legislative framework and legal rules 
governing transparency in automated consumer credit scoring in the EU and US. 
In spite of that, the existing legal rules achieve similar results in both jurisdictions 
in concrete cases.  
 
  A. The EU Approach to Transparency 
 
 Under the GDPR, the data subject has “the right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces 
 
227 Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm? 1041, UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
(Research Paper No. 498). Cf, with Talia Gillis, False Dreams of Algorithmic Fairness: The Case 
of Credit Pricing, at 2 (Nov. 1, 2019) 
https://scholar harvard.edu/files/gillis/files/gillis_jmp_191101.pdf (objecting to the disparate 
impact theory); Zarsky, supra note 207, at 1563-1568 (proposing transparency as a partial solution 
to be implemented both at data collection, analysis and policy decision making level. His analysis 
focuses on government agencies and thus it does not necessarily fit the purpose of regulating 
credit scoring).  
228Chander, supra note 227, at 1024. 
229 Id. at 1024 (“What we need instead is a transparency of inputs and results, which allows us to 
see that the algorithm is generating discriminatory impact. If we know that the results of an 
algorithm are systematically discriminatory, then we know enough to seek to redesign the 
algorithm or to distrust its results.”). 
230Id.  
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legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”231 
In cases where an automated decision is authorized it “should be subject to suitable 
safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the 
right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the 
decision.”232 In this context, the GDPR imposes a requirement of transparency at 
three stages — (a) stage of data collection, (b) during data processing/decision, and 
(c) post-data processing/decision.233 
 
 The consumer has the right to know of the existence of automated decisions 
and the anticipated consequences of such decisions at that stage of data 
collection.234 Furthermore, they have the right to obtain information as to whether 
personal data about him/her is being processed, including the existence of 
automated processing, the logic involved, and the significance and envisaged 
consequence of such processing.235 While the first right allows the consumer to 
refuse consenting to automated processing of data, the second right allows the data 
subject to withdraw consent.236 Hence, these transparency requirements that the 
GDPR put in place have the consequence of ensuring that the data subject is 
informed of the possibility of ADM. Comandé and Malgieri describe this as an ex-
ante right to notification.237 A third stage at which transparency is required in the 
GDPR is post-automated decisions where the data subject has “the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view 
and to contest the decision.”238 
 
 
231GDPR Art. 22. Paragraph 2 recognizes exception, namely automated processing when 
necessitated for entering into or performance of contract between the data subject and the data 
controller and when allowed by the union’s law and based on the data subject’s consent. 
232Id. at recital 71. 
233Id. at art. 12. 
234 Id. at art.13(2) (f). "In addition to the information referred to in paragraph 1, the controller 
shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with the following 
further information necessary to ensure fair and transparent processing: the existence of automated 
decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and, at least in those 
cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.” Id. When personal data are not 
obtained from the data subject, the corresponding provisions of Art. 14(2) (g) applies. 
235Id. at Art. 15(1) (h).  
236Id. 
237Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-
Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 243, 245 
(2017).  
238GDPR at Art. 22(3).  




 In all three stages of the transparency requirements, it seems that the data 
subject has the right to explanation under the GDPR, which would include the right 
to get explanation of the logic involved in the ADM.239 Whether the GDPR in fact 
gives the right to explanation is debated, with some scholars disputing the existence 
of such right due to, among others, its incorporation in recitals without being 
reiterated in any of operative provision of the GDPR.240 
 
 Recitals do not have autonomous binding force as they can only be used to 
interpret the operative provisions of the legislation consistent with the spirit of the 
legislation concerned. 241 The interpretive role that can be played by recital 71 
which contains the right to explanation on ex post facto basis is explained by 
Comandé and Maglieri, who argue that recital 71(a) does not derogate from, nor 
amend article 22, rather it merely clarifies and supplements it, and thus when an 
automated decision is made under article 22, the right to explanation is 
exercisable.242 
 
 The argument in favor of the right to explanation can be countered only 
adopting a formalistic legal interpretation, which lacks support in jurisprudence of 
the CJEU.243 First, the right to explanation of the logic involved exists at the stage 
of data collection and data access. There is no plausible explanation that same right 
does not exist when the consumer wishes to challenge the same decision once it is 
made. Furthermore, to argue that the right to explanation does not exist on an ex 
post facto basis effectively nullifies right to contest, as contestation presupposes 
explanation. Indeed, this line of understanding aligns with teleological 
interpretation of law dominantly adopted by the CJEU where the meaning of a rule 
is constructed in light to its purpose and the overall context.244 
 
 
239Id. at recital 63. With respect to an ex post facto right to explanation, Art. 22 of the GDPR does 
not give the data subject the right to an explanation. Id. at recital 71.  
240See Sandra Wachter, Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L.76 (2017). 
241  Malgieri and Comandé, supra note 237, at 254-55. 
242Id. at 255. 
243  The dominant interpretive approach of the ECJ is teleological or purposive approach where the 
Court interprets a given provision in the light of the objective, purpose, and overall context of the 
law. See Kohen Lenaerts, Interpretation, and the Court of Justice: A Basis for Comparative 
Reflection, 41 INT’L LAWYER 1011, 1017 (2007).  
244Id.; see also Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of 
Justice, 10 GERMAN L. REV. 538, 552 (2009).  
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 While the right to explanation exists under the GDPR, the challenge is lack 
of clear ideas regarding the logic involved in automated processing.245 Although 
the GDPR seems to address the most problematic aspect—understanding how the 
algorithmic decision-making works—by requiring the disclosure of the “the logic 
involved in the automated processing,” it is far from sufficient to deal with the 
challenge, as scholars still struggle to explain what exactly it requires. 
 
 Comandé and Malgieri identify two elements of the algorithmic decision-
making process, namely the functionality (the logic of the algorithm), and the 
contextual implementation of the functionality (with significance and the 
consequence).246 Interpreting the term logic as the architecture of the algorithm, 
meaning its functionality, “significance and envisaged consequences” as the 
implementation of the overall decision-making process, such as the purpose, impact 
and human involvement, Comandé and Malgieri propose legibility—transparency 
and comprehensibility in both aspects of the algorithm.247 They also recognize that 
trade secret law may limit legibility but suggest that it does not result in total denial 
of disclosure of information (at least the ones that do not have an adverse effect on 
the right of the data controller).248 
 
 Trade secret protection is an important obstacle to transparency. While a 
complete account is not provided here, it is worth highlighting the limiting effect 
of trade secrets on algorithmic transparency. The GDPR grants the consumer the 
right to explanation while maintaining that such right may not be exercised to the 
detriment of trade secrets of businesses.249 Despite the appearance of the trade 
secret in recital 63 of the GDPR,250 the GDPR has no specific operative provision 
dedicated to reconciling the potential conflict between right explanation and the 
need to preserve trade secrets. The EU Trade Secret Directive acknowledges that 
trade secrets shall not affect fundamental rights, including the protection of 
personal data. 251  Neither legal regime is clear as to where the protection of 
fundamental rights ends, and trade secret protection begins or vice versa.252 
 
245 Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to Explanation' is 
probably not the Remedy You are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 19, 49 (2017); see also 
Lehr & Ohm, supra note 138, at 707-08. 
246Malgieri &Comandé, supra note 237, at 258. 
247 Id. at 265. 
248Id. 
249GDPR at recital 63. 
250Id. 
251Council Directive 2016/943, recital 34, 2016 O.J.  (L 157) 1, 7.  
252 Maja Brkean and Grégory Bonnet, Legal and Technical Feasibility of the GDPR’s Quest for 
Explanation of Algorithmic Decisions: of Black Boxes, White Boxes and Fata Morganas, 11 
 





 In 2014, the German Federal Court of Justice, based on the now-repealed 
Data Protection Directive concluded that the data subject has the right to access all 
their personal data used in credit scoring, but has no right to access (a) how the 
scoring algorithm weighed various factors, and (b) how the reference groups used 
to arrive at a credit score were comprised. 253  This essentially means that the 
consumer has the right to access the inputs and the output, the latter as a natural 
consequence of the decision being handed to the consumer. Under the directive, the 
prevailing approach in Germany seems to be the disparate impact theory of 
transparency where it is sufficient for the consumer to access the input and the 
output without the need for disclosing the internal functioning of the algorithm. As 
shown later, this is no different than what can be achieved using the provisions of 
the FCRA in the US.254 One caveat to be added is that the German Court decision 
is based on the Data Protection Directive, not under the GDPR.255 Nevertheless, the 
wordings of the recitals in the two legal instruments on the role of trade secret in 
limiting disclosure are identical.256 
 
 In the unchartered territory of machine learning, the GDPR’s provisions on 
the right to explanation are as helpless as any other old legal rule. The challenges 
machine learning presents are multifaceted. Machine learning decisions could be 
opaque to the consumers, to the financial institution, and even to the algorithmic 
software creators themselves. In exceptional cases where machine learning credit 
scoring is permitted (consented to, necessary for the formation or performance of 
contract)257 it may be employed. The seemingly comprehensive transparency rules 
of the GDPR would serve no meaningful purpose in that case.  
 
 To conclude, the GDPR provisions on transparency are impracticable for 
two reasons. First, trade secret law may be invoked not to disclose the internal logic 
of the algorithm. So far, this has been the case under the previous data protection 
 
EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REG. 18, 40 (2020) (“From a legal perspective, it therefore remains rather 
unclear which set of rules should take precedence in case of conflict of trade secrets with data 
subjects’ rights.”); see also Gianclaudio Malgieri, Trade Secrets v Personal Data: a possible 
solution, 6 INT. DATA PRIVACY L. 102 (2016) (presenting additional optimistic approaches to the 
relationship between transparency and trade secrets for algorithms). 
253Hunton Andews Kurt, Federal German Court Rules on Credit Scoring and Data Subject Access 
Rights, HUNTON PRIV. BLOG (January 29, 2014)  
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2014/01/29/federal-german-court-rules-credit-scoring-data-
subject-access-rights/. 
254See infra ii (The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Transparency Provisions). 
255Kurt, supra note 253. 
256 Cf. GDPR at recital 63; Council Directive 95/46/EC, recital 41, 1995 O.J. L. 281, 31, 35 
(1995). 
257GDPR at art. 6(2) (a-c). 
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law, at least in Germany. Given that the provisions governing ADM remained the 
same under the GDPR, the likelihood that trade secret protection is invoked in a 
similar fashion is high. Second, in case of machine learning credit scoring, it may 
not actually be possible to disclose anything as the system can be a black box to all 
stakeholders. Therefore, any reform proposal that calls for emulating the GDPR 
regarding ADM does not take into consideration the practical obstacles that 
undermine transparency and effective consumer protection.  
 
 
  B. The US Approach to Transparency 
 
 In the US, there are no tailored legal regimes applicable to ADM including 
in consumer credit scoring. Automated consumer credit scoring is governed by the 
FCRA.258 Before discussing the key transparency provisions of the FCRA, a brief 
overview of the EU-US PS framework which extends the key principles of EU data 
protection law to organizations operating in the US is useful as it underlines the 
different regulatory approaches to ADM prevailing in the two jurisdictions.  
 
   i. The EU-US Privacy Shield Framework 
 
 Due to the absence of comprehensive data protection law in the US, data 
controllers transferring data from the EU to US should ensure that they process the 
data by respecting the privacy rights of EU data subjects. The EU-US PS 
Framework was created to achieve this purpose.259 Although the EU Commission’s 
adequacy decision regarding the PS Framework was struck down by the CJEU on 
July 16, 2020,260 its history and the manner in which it was structured provides an 
excellent insight into how US consumer credit law addresses ADM. Under the PS 
Framework, certain principles of the EU data protection law must be implemented 




25815 U.S.C. §§ 1681(g)(1)(B)(i-ii), 1681(a)(5)(D). 
259The EU-US Privacy Shield decision was adopted on July 12, 2016 and the Privacy Shield 
framework became operational on August 1, 2016. See EU-US Data Transfers, EUROPA, 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/eu-us-data-
transfers_en. 
260See Data Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd. and Maximillian Schrems, Case C‑311/18, n. 201 
(July 16, 2020). 
261Council Implementing Decision 2016/1250, recital 14, 2016 O.J.L. 207, 1, 3 (July 12, 2016), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.207.01.0001.01.ENG. 




 While the PS framework was not a complete extension of the EU data 
protection law to participating organizations, the key principles of the GDPR are 
restated and should be implemented.262 Nevertheless, the Commission and the US 
Department of Commerce decided not to add any of the rules of the GDPR 
governing ADM in the PS framework.263 According to the Commission’s adequacy 
decision, ADM has limited application today and in areas where it occurs such as 
in consumer lending, the existing US legal regimes provide specific protections 
against adverse decisions. 264  The decision also indicated the need to closely 
monitor the area as ADM is an evolving phenomenon.265 Finally, the decision 
anticipated a study to be conducted on ADM and to be presented as a part of the 
first and second annual review of the PS Framework.266 The adequacy decision 
remained in effect after the second annual review. 267  Consequently, the PS 
Framework excludes automated data processing which means that US-based 
companies that self-certify to comply with PS Framework were not required to 
comply with the GDPR provisions governing ADM. The FCRA act remains the 
applicable legal regime in the US today.  
 
   ii. The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Transparency  
    Provisions 
 
 The first rule under the FCRA that aims to enhance transparency allows the 
consumer to access its file from consumer reporting agencies.268 Hence, “[e]very 
consumer reporting agency shall, upon request . . . clearly and accurately disclose 
to the consumer all information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request.”269 
The FCRA defines file broadly as “all of the information on the consumer recorded 
 
262There are seven principles, each entailing their own legal obligations that organizations must 
comply with under the PS framework. These are the Notice Principle, the Data Integrity and 
Purpose Limitation Principle, the Choice Principle, the Security Principle, the Access Principle, 
the Recourse, Enforcement and Liability Principle, and the Accountability for Onward Transfer 
Principle. Id. at recitals 20–28. 




267See Staff Working Document SWD (2018) 497 Final, accompanying document Rep.from the 
Comm’n to the Eur. Parliament and the Council, at 4-5, COM (2018) 860 final (Dec. 19, 2018). 
268The term “consumer reporting agency” means “any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or 
on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of 
assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the 
purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility of 
interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” 15 U.S.C. § 
1681a(f). 
269 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g). 
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and retained by a consumer reporting agency regardless of how the information is 
stored.”270 If the consumer requests only a credit file, the CRA has the obligation 
to inform the consumer that they have the right to request and obtain a credit 
score.271 Additionally, the consumer has the right to obtain summary of their rights 
on a model form prepared by the CFPB.272 
 
 The CRA has the obligation not only to disclose a consumer file but also a 
credit score if requested by the consumer together with the statement that “the 
information and the credit score model may be different than the credit score that 
may be used by the lender.”273 Generally, lenders have no duty to provide credit 
score to consumers ex ante.274 Nevertheless, lenders that take adverse action, have 
the obligation to provide the consumer’s credit score along with name and address 
of the CRA that provided the information to the lender.275 While the FCRA gives 
the consumer the right to dispute the accuracy of information held by the CRA,276 
it imposes several obligations on CRA, including obligations to take reasonable 
steps to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of consumer reports.277 
 
 Based on the overview of the FCRA rules on transparency, a few 
conclusions can be drawn. First, there is no prohibition of ADM in consumer credit 
risk assessment in the US. A fact-finding article published in 2018 revealed that “in 
the US, automation, as opposed to human decision-making, is generally viewed as 
less biased and a way to improve effectiveness, as well as a cost-saving 
measure.”278 The legal regime on automated credit scoring reflects this sentiment. 
Second, the consumers’ right to information about credit report or credit score does 
not necessarily include the right to obtain how the given credit score is calculated. 
The consumer has the right to obtain their credit score along with the key factors 
used in the scoring.279 Nevertheless, similarly to EU consumers, US consumers 
 
270 Id. 
271See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 g(a)(6), g(f)(1). 
272 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(1). 
273 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(f).  
274 15 U.S.C. §1681g(f)(6). 
275 15 U.S.C. §1681m(a)(3)(A). 
276 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(3)(B)(IV). 
277 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
278Gabriela Bodea, et al., Automated decision-making on the basis of personal data that has been 
transferred from the EU to companies certified under the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield: Fact-finding 
and assessment of safeguards provided by U.S. law 22–23, (European Commission Final 
Report)(Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers)(October 2018). 
279See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 g(f)(1)(C). 15 U.S.C. § 1681 g(f)(2)(B) defines the term “key factors” as 
“all relevant elements or reasons adversely affecting the credit score for the particular individual, 
listed in the order of their importance based on their effect on the credit score.” 




equally enjoy the right to legally challenge adverse decisions regardless of the 
limited information available.   
 
 There are multiples cases in the US involving ADM that led to massive 
fines. In 2018, the FTC imposed a large fine on Realpage (CRA) for inaccurate 
credit reporting.280 Although the dispute involves credit report of potential tenants, 
the process, provides insight into how consumers use the US legal regime to 
confront ADM, including for consumer credit scoring.281 In this case, Realpage 
conducted a criminal background check on rental applicants using an automated 
system.282 Through name and birthdate of the applicant, the algorithm matches the 
applicant with available criminal records. 283  This software program wrongly 
attributed criminal records to certain applicants (e.g., finding matches between 
Anthony Jones 10/15/67 and Antony Jones 10/15/67).284 Realpage was fined for 
deploying a defective algorithm.285 
 
 In a more pertinent case, in 2017 the CFPB fined Conduent LLC (formerly 
Xerox Business) $1.1 Million for inaccurate consumer credit reporting using an 
automated process. 286  As a third-party service provider, Conduent provided 
automated auto loan consumer credit reporting to lenders and credit reporting 
agencies.287 The information provided by Conduent was used to determine whether 
the consumer qualified for loan or favorable loan terms. 288  The automated 
consumer credit information provided by Conduent contained errors of various 
categories in the files of over 1 million consumers, including a report of involuntary 
repossession of vehicles, or errors on other critical consumer information including 
account default related information.289 Thus, Conduent used defective software to 
automate the credit reporting,290 and was held accountable under the FCRA. 
 
280Texas Company Will Pay $3 million to Settle FTC Charges That it Failed to Meet Accuracy 








286CFPB Fines Xerox Business Services $1.1 Million for Incorrect Consumer Information Sent to 
Credit Reporting Agencies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-fines-xerox-business-services-11-
million-incorrect-consumer-information-sent-credit-reporting-agencies/. 
287In re Conduent Business Servs. LLC., 2017 C.F.P.B. 0020 (consent order) (Nov. 17, 2017). 
288Id. 
289Id. at ¶ 10. 
290Id. at ¶ 12 et seq. 




   iii. Oldy but Goody 
 
 The FTC and CFPB enforcement actions reveal that the existing legal rules 
are capable of addressing technology-based challenges. In the case of Conduent, 
even if it is a third party that provided consumer credit information, it is under 
obligation to provide accurate credit reporting. 291  In the case of Realpage, 
provisions of the FCRA have been applied to an automated criminal background 
check.292 The two cases demonstrate that the FCRA is capable of protecting the 
consumer from adverse decisions, as much as the GDPR could, notwithstanding the 
fact that it was enacted without explicitly addressing ADM. Nevertheless, it is also 
likely that in more complex cases, the US consumer would be able to win a judicial 
battle by compelling the data controller to disclose the decision-making process 
under electronic discovery procedure.293 Thus, despite the difference in the legal 
rules in the two jurisdictions, the outcomes of legal controversies are likely to be 
the same in both jurisdictions. Nevertheless, advanced machine learning credit 
scoring presents an elevated challenge that legal rules in both jurisdictions are ill-
prepared to tackle.294 
 
5. THE LIMITS OF THE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF AUTOMATED CONSUMER 
CREDIT SCORING REGULATION 
 
5.1.  MACHINE LEARNING CONSUMER CREDIT SCORING—A DEAD END 
 
 This article is a response to the prevailing view that consumers are more 
vulnerable in the US than in the EU in the sphere of algorithmic credit scoring. It 
has countered this view by examining the effectiveness of some of the legal rules 
that are perceived as useful tools to protecting the consumer including consent and 
transparency in the EU and demonstrated that US consumer credit law responds to 
ADM in consumer credit scoring in a comparable manner. But, the key arguments 
as well as the real cases used as illustration involved automated systems using the 
so-called classical AI, a computer program that follows pre-determined set of rules 
to produce an outcome. Automation can also be based on more advanced AI 
 
291The respondent is defined as a service provider and thus is a covered entity under 12 U.S.C.S. § 
5481(26) (2021). 
292Realpage was defined as a Consumer Reporting Agency within the meaning of the FCRA 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 a(f). It was found, among others, to be in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) which 
requires ensuring accuracy in consumer credit reporting.   
293See generally Laura Hunt, Comment, Trending: Proportionality in Electronic Discovery in 
Common Law Countries and the United States' Federal and State Courts, 43 UNIV. BALTIMORE L. 
REV. 279, 288 (2014). 
294See infra Section 5. 




systems include computer programs that update themselves as they encounter more 
data. 295 This AI system known more loosely as machine learning could attain 
autonomy and have agency (the ability to evaluate principles and make choices).296 
Thus, while rule-based AI is fairly controlled by a human agent as the software 
programmer writes specific instruction for the decision making process, machine 
learning might be out of control unless some procedure is put in place to keep 
humans in the loop. Hence, the policy concerns raised by the two are quite different. 
 
 Machine learning may be effectively used for profiling online and 
customizing search results as well as performing other tasks with different socio-
economic consequences. The use of machine learning techniques to profile 
individuals outside consumer credit scoring is criticized for, among others, 
misclassification of individuals based on characteristics that have nothing to do 
with them, with serious implications including potential discrimination and 
deprivation of individual autonomy.297 
 
 Certainly, attempting to regulate the most advanced form of machine 
learning using old legal rules is doomed to reach a dead end. Although there is no 
evidence of the use of autonomous, unexplainable AI system in the consumer credit 
industry, should such technology be deployed, the solution cannot be found in 
tweaking the existing legal rules or even overhauling the law, whether in the EU or 
the US. Even the GDPR’s presumably well-thought through and comprehensive 
rules are inapt to regulating machine learning decisions. Commenting on the 
GDPR’s right to explanation rule, Nick Wallace argues: 
 
More importantly, those who drafted the GDPR do 
not seem to understand that it is often not practical or 
even possible, to explain all decisions made by 
algorithms. For example, autonomous vehicles are 
controlled by a multitude of algorithms that make 
many kinds of decisions. It is possible to log these 
actions, but it would take hours of work by highly-
paid data scientists to render them intelligible. Often, 
the challenge of explaining an algorithmic decision 
 
295Id. 
296Brent Daniel Mittelstadt et al., The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping the Debate, 3 BIG DATA & 
SOC’Y 1, 3 (2016) (“Machine learning is defined by the capacity to define or modify decision 
making rules autonomously.”); see also Rachel Wilka et al., How Machines Learn: Where Do 
Companies Get Data for Machine Learning and What Licenses Do They Need?, 13 WASH. J.L. 
TECH. & ART 217, 223 (2018).   
297Comandè, supra note 6, at 176. 
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comes not from the complexity of the algorithm, but 




 Today, even governments acknowledge the unpreparedness of the legal 
regimes to address machine learning decisions. The United Kingdom’s 
Government Office for Science noted that “most fundamentally, transparency may 
not provide the proof sought: simply sharing static code provides no assurance that 
it was actually used in a particular decision, or that it behaves in the wild in the way 
its programmers expect on a given dataset.”299 
 
 Machine learning decisions require a holistic and cautious approach to 
regulation that strikes a fair balance between encouraging innovation and consumer 
protection. In this last section of the article, key features of regulation of machine 
learning consumer credit scoring are laid out.  
 
5.2.  RISK-BASED APPROACH TO REGULATION 
 
 Any regulatory authority that is anxious about pervasive machine learning 
decisions in the credit industry should reject the temptation to impose a categorical 
ban or a prohibition that might stifle innovation. The more sensible solution is to 
adopt sector specific and risk-based approach,300 where if the benefits of machine 
learning decision are outweighed by the costs of erroneous decisions, the system 
should be banned or be subject to stricter scrutiny. Machine learning decisions raise 
different types and degrees of concern in different spheres. To discuss a reasonable 
policy framework for the regulation of machine learning decisions, those different 
areas should be identified, isolated, and regulated, unless specific explanation is 
offered to create a general regulatory framework.    
 
 The European Commission’s White Paper on Artificial Intelligence issued 
in 2020 introduced a risk-based approach to future regulation of AI acknowledging 
 
298Nick Wallace, EU's Right to Explanation: A Harmful Restriction on Artificial Intelligence, 
TECHNOZONE360 (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/2017/01/25/429101-eus-right-explanation-
harmful-restriction-artificial-intelligence htm. 
299Government Office of Sciences, Artificial intelligence: opportunities and implications for the 
future of decision making 16 (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
566075/gs-16-19-artificial-intelligence-ai-report.pdf. 
300Frederik J. ZuiderveenBorgesius, Strengthening legal protection against discrimination by 
algorithms and artificial intelligence, 24 THE INT’L J. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1572, 1586 (2020). 




that the current legal regime including the GDPR does not necessarily address 
certain aspects of AI.301 The white paper proposes a two-step analysis. The first 
step is to identify certain AI applications that are generally regarded as high risk.302 
The second step is to determine whether a given application within a sector is likely 
to pose a significant risk.303 
 
 In April 2021, the EU Commission published a Draft AI Regulation that 
adopted the risk-based approach.304 The DAIR has three categories of AI systems 
to which different legal requirements apply. These are AI systems that pose (a) 
unacceptable risk (banned), (b) high risk, and (c) limited risk.305 An AI system used 
for the assessment of the creditworthiness of natural persons (consumers) is listed 
as a high-risk AI System under Annex III of the DAIR.306 With respect to high-risk 
AI Systems, stringent ex ante requirements are applied. These requirements relate 
to risk management, data governance, transparency, record keeping, human 
oversight, and robustness.307 
 
 High risk AI Systems including those used for credit scoring are expected 
to meet the requirements of conformity that must be monitored ex ante,308 for 
instance that  a credit scoring algorithm is not used unless it does not pose risk to 
the rights of the consumers (conformity). The requirements are imposed ex ante 
with compliance supervised by the relevant state authority. The DAIR does not 
address the rights of consumers aggrieved by an algorithmic decision (the right to 
human intervention, explanation, and redress). These rights of the consumer (data 
subject) are still to be governed by the GDPR unless the DAIR is revised before it 
is adopted to change the status quo. Hence, if a scoring algorithm is approved to be 
put to use and yet makes an inaccurate or discriminatory decision, the DAIR does 
not have rules that the consumer can use for redress. Although some of the rules 
including the one that requires automatic record-keeping allow the errors to be 
traced easily that the consumer can potentially use in a legal proceeding, the DAIR 
is not designed to address the rights of consumers that they can directly enforce. 
 
 
301 EU Commission, White Paper: On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence 
and trust (COM (2020) 65 final, 2020), 17.  
302 Id.  
303 Id.  
304 See supra note 31.  
305 EU Commission, New rules for Artificial Intelligence – Questions and Answers (April 21, 
2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_1683#1.  
306 DAIR Annex III, 5(b). AI systems put into service by small scale providers for their own use 
are not regarded as high-risk AI Systems.  
307 DAIR at Arts. 8 et seq.  
308 Id. at Arts. 40 et seq.  
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 The current risk-based approach, therefore, does not resolve some of the 
underlying problems in ADM in consumer credit risk assessment (e.g., the 
difficulty in explaining machine learning decisions and the degree of disclosure of 
information that is considered sufficient to satisfy the right to explanation). 
Although the DAIR’s risk-based approach which treats consumer credit scoring AI 
Systems as high risk is appropriate and the ex-ante conformity requirements are 
robust, the approach does not necessarily satisfactorily protect the consumer from 
machine learning decisions. For instance, one of the rules under the DAIR states 
that “High-risk AI systems that continue to learn after being placed on the market 
or put into service shall be developed in such a way to ensure that possibly biased 
outputs due to outputs used as an input for future operations (‘feedback loops’) are 
duly addressed with appropriate mitigation measures.”309 This provision clearly 
concedes that biased outputs may occur and in the case of machine learning 
decisions, the user of the system should take mitigating measures for the future. If 
taking a mitigation measure for the future is the most the law can expect deployers 
of machine learning algorithms to perform in case of biases, it is fair to conclude 
that remedy to the aggrieved consumer is not the priority. This triggers further 
related questions. Does that mean for instance a machine learning decision can be 
made in credit card, car loan, and mortgage loan applications provided that the AI 
System has fulfilled the ex-ante conformity rules? Does that mean biased decisions 
in these cases are to be addressed by way of implementing mitigation measures for 
the future? The response to these questions appears to be affirmative and it is not 
reassuring for EU consumers.  
 
 Granted, a financial institution might not use machine learning when 
making important decisions such whether to grant a mortgage loan. But under the 
DAIR, there is nothing that prevents them from doing so, if they have obtained the 
necessary ex ante approval for the machine learning algorithm. This a dangerous 
position to take while designing a legal framework for such a complex 
phenomenon. The legal framework in this area, in addition to the overall risk-based 
approach should be designed on sectoral basis. Thus, algorithmic credit scoring 
requires its own legal framework that takes into account different types of credits. 
  
5.3. REGULATORY SANDBOXING 
 
 Regulatory sandbox is one of the most debated and increasing accepted 
notions in the field of financial technology. In its most basic form, regulatory 
sandbox is “a regulatory ‘safe space’ for experimentation with new approaches 
 
309 Id. at Art. 15(3).  




involving the application of technology to finance.”310 As of July 2020, there are 
over 40 countries around the globe including the United States that have either 
announced or implemented some kind of regulatory sandbox. 311  There is no 
consensus on the objective for implementing regulatory sandboxes. The United 
States Department of Treasury in its 2018 report called for a regulatory sandbox 
that aims to enhance financial innovation.312 But, Allen argues that objectives of 
regulatory sandbox should include not only encouraging innovation but also 
protecting consumers and ensuring market stability.313 
 
 While regulatory sandbox is premised on an entry barrier for Fintech 
companies due to excessive regulatory burden, 314  it provides regulators the 
opportunity to observe the regulatory challenges posed by a financial technology in 
a controlled environment, 315  working with a FinTech company that provides 
financial products or services to consumers without complying regulatory 
requirements.316 
 
 Current legal rules are ill-equipped to respond to a plethora of challenges 
that could emerge from machine learning credit risk assessment. A regulatory 
sandbox would provide an ideal environment for regulators to understand benefits 
of various innovations and the risks they pose to consumers along with the possible 
safeguards. According to the National Conference of State Law, fifteen US states 
have either proposed or implemented regulatory sandbox laws.317 
 
 
310 Dirk A. Zetzsche, et al, Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandbox to Smart 
Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 45(2017). 
311 Digital Financial Services Observatory, Regulatory Sandboxes, COLUM. BUS. SCH. (2016), 
https://dfsobservatory.com/content/regulatory-sandboxes.  
312U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunity for Nonbank 
Financials, Fintech, and Innovation 17, 168 
(2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-
Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf (“[F]ederal and state financial regulators 
establish a unified solution that coordinates and expedites regulatory relief under applicable laws 
and regulations to permit meaningful experimentation for innovative products, services, and 
processes. Such efforts would form, in essence, a “regulatory sandbox” that can enhance and 
promote innovation.”). 
313 Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 583(2019).  
314Id. at 587.  
315Id. at 583.  
316 William Magnuson, Regulating Fintech, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1167,1224-25(2018).  
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 Under New York regulatory sandbox program, the company concerned has 
twelve months,318 subject to additional six months’ extension319 to test its product 
transaction with not more than 50,000 consumers that must be residents of New 
York State.320 Consumers have the right to get full disclosure of the nature of the 
product or service they receive.321 
 
 The CFPB also introduced a regulatory sandbox program effective from 
September 2019. 322  The CFPB is criticized for its leniency toward market 
regulation by exposing consumers to potential abuses as it permits companies to 
test their products without complying with regulatory requirements, with no 
administrative sanction or liability under private law.323 
 
 Legal scholars investigating machine learning decisions are criticized for 
their focus largely on the deployment of the algorithm and the actual decision 
makings (the running model) rather than investigating other important stages in 
machine learning process. 324  Lehr and Ohm argue that “another reason legal 
scholars in particular need to focus on playing with the data is that combatting 
harms at the running-model stage is often too little too late.”325 They argue that 
rather than focusing on discrimination at running model and during data collection, 
discrimination is tackled better if an intervention is made at “several key, often 
overlooked, stages of machine learning.” 326  They assert for instance that 
“mitigating algorithmic discriminations require intervening during model tuning 
and model training.”327 “Model training includes tuning, assessment and feature 
selection.” 328  Thus, an algorithm could be modified if it makes a disparate 
classification at the stage of tuning.329 Regulatory sandboxes could be designed not 
 
318New York Regulatory Sandbox Act, N.Y. § 705(a) (2018), 
https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/bills/2017/S9188.   
319 § 705(b). 
320 § 703(d). 
321 § 704(e).  
322 CFPB, Policy on the Compliance Assistance Sandbox, (Docket No. CFPB-2018-0042)(Sept. 
10, 2019), September 10, 2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_final-policy-
on-cas.pdf.   
323 Matthew J. Razzano, An Unsafe Sandbox: Fintech Innovation at the Expense of Consumer 
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only to ensure inclusiveness in the machine learning training, but also to allow 
regulatory agencies to obtain real time feedback on the challenges that could be 
faced during the process. 
 
 Much can be written about flaws in the way the New York or CFBC 
programs have been designed. For instance, the lack of cap on transaction values 
that can be involved in a service benefiting from a regulatory program is 
problematic because, one way of reducing consumer harm is to allow low value 
transactions. Moreover, stronger cooperation between regulatory authorities and 
the regulatory sandbox program recipients, including an exchange in technical 
knowledge is lacking in both programs. Nevertheless, a carefully designed 
regulatory sandbox could be valuable in regulating AI in the credit industry by 
balancing various competing interests including consumer protection and 
encouraging innovation. 
 
 The DAIR has also provisions on regulatory sandboxing.330 The DAIR’s 
provisions are woefully inadequate to address various challenges relating to 
implementing a successful regulatory sandboxing program that advances 
innovation while not undermining consumer rights. As the DAIR’s provisions are 
to be implemented by the EU Member States through further legislation, it would 
be futile to critique its limited number of provisions. Member States should invite 




 Scholars have juxtaposed EU and US legal rules on ADM. The consensus 
seems to be that the EU approach to the regulation of ADM is superior due to the 
GDPR’s comparatively detailed provisions on transparency in ADM, as well as its 
stringent consent requirements in addition to the applicable general prohibition of 
significant solely ADM. This article rejects this conventional wisdom and has 
argued that US consumer credit law has the necessary flexibility in 
accommodating the challenges emanating from ADM in consumer credit until the 
point where complex machine learning decisions are applied. The latter is a dead 
end both for the EU and US legal regimes. The real question is where we go from 
the dead end? 
 
 First, any regulatory intervention should balance the advantages of 
efficiency and inclusiveness (if any) in financial services on the one hand, and 
 
Bie, &Nello Cristianini, eds., 2012); see also Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in 
Supervised Learning, 8-10, ARXIV.ORG (2016), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1610.02413.pdf.  
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consumer protection from potential inaccuracy and biases/discrimination on the 
other. The legitimacy of any law is judged ultimately by its ability to strike a fair 
balance between the costs and benefits, and its ability to maximize the benefits 
and minimize the cost incurred by society.  
 
 The GDPR provisions governing ADM, although a good starting point for 
regulatory debate, by no means achieve a fair balance between encouraging 
innovation and consumer protection. Its general prohibition of solely ADM has 
the potential to stifle innovation without making the consumer better off as in 
Germany or to expose consumers to abuses as in the UK. The GDPR’s provisions 
pertaining to consent and transparency in relation to ADM are as good as legal 
rules found in decades’ old consumer credit laws in the US. This article 
emphasizes therefore that if the US wishes to implement regulatory regimes on 
ADM in the consumer credit industry, the GDPR is not the model to emulate.  
 
 Regarding complex machine learning decisions, the article proposed a 
risk-based approach to regulating, and the heightened use of regulatory 
sandboxing to allow FinTech companies to experiment their products in more fair 
and transparent manner. Although the EU’s DAIR has incorporated both 
recommendations, it is far from addressing the complex challenges of machine 
learning.  
 
